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This research will explore the relevance of the human being as an element in an 
information system.  The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence technology, 
especially information technology, has had on the way human beings understand and use 
information systems.  This study will look at the use of forward air controllers and close 
air support in the European Theater of Operations during WWII and evaluate the 
technology, the doctrine and the people involved as they related to the forward air 
control-close air support information system.  Other areas that will be discussed as they 
relate to the development of close air support include: incremental vs. radical change, 
organizational culture and change, and the dynamic nature of current and future 
operations as they relate to information systems. 
The primary research objective is to explore the answer to the following question: 
Based on the role of forward air controller in the European Theater of Operations during 
World War Two, what is the significance of the human being as an element in an 
information system?  Secondary questions include:  What are the necessary elements that 
make up an information system?    How and where were forward air controllers used and 
were they effective?  What were the information systems used by the forward air 
controllers and were they effective?  Last, what implications do the findings of this 
research have for current technologies, organizational structure and the interaction 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What is an information system?  Mason and Mitroff (1973) and Cohen (1983) 
conceptualized information systems (IS) in terms that are useful in a discussion about 
forward air controllers (FACs) and close air support (CAS) as parts of a military 
information system.  Replacing their use of “business client” with the term “warfighter” 
yields a workable definition: “Information systems provide warfighters with information 
[data] in a form, format, and schedule that maximizes their effectiveness.”  Information 
systems help the human being to select, organize and structure data so that it is useful for 
more efficient management and decision-making.  In a purely military context, 
information systems involve sensing capabilities, command and control (C2), 
management, and the information content of weapons (Arquilla 2001).  
As technological innovations continue to be injected into the U.S. Armed Forces, 
the reliance on and faith in technology as a panacea to correct present and future force 
deficiencies increases.  The dramatic increase in information availability fosters, in some 
decision-makers, a conviction that the human being is no longer a necessary element in 
the Information Age (Boland 365).  Believers in this paradigm are known as 
technologists, or what Mackubin Thomas Owens would call, technophiles (Owens, 1998, 
p 67).  Though not the dominant paradigm, techno-centric thinking is increasing as 
military decision-makers confuse data with knowledge and understanding.  Thomas 
Davenport, a consultant and reengineering advocate wrote, “Our fascination with 
technology has made us forget the key purpose of information [systems]: to inform 
people” (Haigh, 2001, p 25).  
In the past, military leaders have often sought innovations that would allow them 
to strike farther, with deadlier force, while reducing risk to their own personnel.  The 
airplane was one such innovation that seemingly allowed military leaders to achieve their 
goal.  But, the airplane could do more than long-range bombing.  It could also be a 
powerful asset to ground forces in close proximity to the enemy.  This concept was 
seriously considered and developed by the American Army Ground Forces (AGF) and 
Army Air Forces (AAF) in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) in World War 
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Two (WWII).  Remarkably, innovations in CAS and the use of FACs were achieved 
despite resistance from AAF commanders in Washington D.C.  The FACs and their 
signaling and communication methods, combined with the CAS aircraft, made up an 
information system that had remarkable effects on the enemy. 
Today, military leaders continue to seek new ways of improving the effectiveness 
of their forces.  Like past leaders, military leaders of today tend to seek out technical 
advances over organizational reform, doctrinal review and personnel training.  The cult of 
the technologist appears to be alive and well in today’s armed forces.  The rate at which 
new systems are added and removed from military systems is a testament to this trend.  
Keeping abreast of the latest advances in technology is essential to military success but 
up to date organizational structures, doctrine and personnel training is just as important.   
 
A. PURPOSE 
This research will explore the relevance of the human being as an element in an 
information system.  The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence technology, 
especially information technology, has had on the way human beings understand and use 
information systems.  This study will look at the use of FACs and CAS in the ETO of 
WWII and evaluate the technology, the doctrine and the people involved as they related 
to the FAC-CAS information system.  Other areas that will be discussed as they relate to 
the development of CAS include: incremental vs. radical change, organizational culture 
and change, and the dynamic nature of current and future operations as they relate to 
information systems.   
The primary research objective is to explore the answer to the following question: 
Based on the role of forward air controllers in the European Theater of Operations during 
World War Two, what is the significance of the human being as an element in an 
information system?  Secondary questions include:  What are the necessary elements that 
make up an information system?    How and where were FACs used and were they 
effective?  What were the information systems used by the FACs and were they 
effective?  Last, what implications do the findings of this research have for current 
technologies, organizational structure and the interaction between human beings and 
information systems in U.S. military operations? 
2 
 B. BACKGROUND 
 In today’s technology-centered military, many commanders share a desire to have 
what Admiral Bill Owens champions as the “system of systems.”  The system of systems, 
a high-tech and near-automated capability, will allow commanders to achieve “dominant 
battlespace knowledge, near-perfect mission assignment, and immediate/complete battle 
assessment” (Owens, 2000, p 98-99).  Figure 1 depicts these three capabilities within the 
system of systems framework.  The three rings represent the traditional functions of 
command: to see, to tell and to act.  It should be apparent that the system of systems 
depicted in Figure 1 is similar to the “observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop.”  
However, Owens neglects to point out the intersection (shaded area) of the see, tell and 
act rings.  This is arguably the most important part of the OODA loop and system of 





Figure 1.   The System of Systems.  (After: Owens, 2000, p. 99). 
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It is as if the proponents of the system of systems believe that technology alone 
holds the keys to quick and relatively inexpensive victories. Casualty aversion, real or 
perceived, limited personnel and tightly controlled funding resources are some of the 
factors that contribute to this utopian belief.  Moore’s Law, the theory that computer chip 
processing speed and memory capacity in bytes per chip will increase by a factor of ten 
every five years and by a factor of 100 every decade (Denning, 1999, p 294), has been 
unjustifiably extended to all areas of information systems and technology (Arquilla 
2001).   
Granted, technological improvements have bolstered U.S. military capabilities, 
especially in the information systems that they employ.  However, can these new and 
future systems be effective without human interaction?  Admiral Owens states that, “one 
of the greatest opportunities of the current Revolution in Military Affairs is to design and 
build computer networks that can enhance-and replace-humans in many aspects of the 
data “fusion” process (Owens, 2000, p 135).”  The data “fusion” process and its meaning 
will be addressed later in this study. 
 Advanced sensors, targeting devices and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) 
have improved the accuracy and lethality (the information content of weaponry) of 
today’s forces at even greater range.  Advances in command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) have increased military capability and flexibility.  
Despite these high-tech improvements the U.S. military faces significant challenges in 
locating the enemy and avoiding friendly-fire casualties (Arquilla 2001; Dept. SECDEF 
Wolfowitz 22 February 2002).  An example of this occurred in the ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan where a stray PGM from an American bomber wounded five U.S. 
servicemen and killed three others (Wood, 2001, p 1).  In another accident in March of 
2001, a misguided bomb at a training site in Kuwait killed six servicemen.  The bomb 
that killed these servicemen was also a PGM (Wood, 2001, p 1).  Friendly fire does not 
go away; though it is far less a problem than WWII, Korea, or Vietnam (Arquilla 2001).   
Even though improvements in technology greatly improve military capabilities, 
the question that arises is whether technology can completely replace human judgment 
and intuition, especially when lives are at risk?  Is it possible that the U.S. military’s 
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near-total faith in technology is partly responsible for training shortfalls, associated with 
the human being-technology interaction, that caused the previously mentioned accidents?  
Is it possible that some of the lessons learned from WWII have been forgotten? 
 Sixty years ago AAF and AGF officers sought the answer to the previous 
questions.  Although the context of the questions was different and the level of 
technology was a mere shadow of what exists today, the importance was just as 
legitimate and, arguably until the events of September the 11th, a great deal more urgent.  
The WWII invasion and breakout of Normandy marked a crucial turning point in the 
allied effort to defeat the Germans in the ETO.  AAF and AGF officers struggled with the 
problem of bringing the airplane and its firepower to the front lines in a CAS role.  Due 
to organizational and cultural differences within the U.S. Army at that time, no effective 
CAS doctrine existed.  Many attempts were made to improve CAS but most failed. It was 
not until the introduction of the FAC, combined with the technology of the day, did the 
CAS mission succeed.   
 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
 The scope of this study will focus on an analysis of available historical documents 
relating to the use of FACs and CAS by U.S. Forces during the European Campaign of 
WWII.  An attempt will be made to evaluate the effectiveness of the FACs and their 
underlying information system(s).  The first use of CAS occurred during WWI, but only 
briefly.  I chose WWII as a case study because it was the first major conflict where CAS 
and FAC doctrine was developed and effectively employed.  I chose to focus on the 
American effort to develop CAS because it was done, for the most part, under the stress 
of wartime conditions.  Little attention was given to CAS development in the interwar 
period because of the AAF’s single-mindedness about pursuing long-range strategic 
bombing technology and doctrine.  Yet, by war’s end, dramatic results were achieved.  A 
brief discussion of German CAS development will be included and contrasted with the 
American effort. 
Included in this study will be a brief discussion of information theory and what 
constitutes an information system and its relationship to human beings.  This study will 
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also utilize first hand accounts from American fighter-bomber pilots.  A discussion of 
interviews held with U.S. Air Force (USAF) F-117 pilots and U.S. Marine Corps 
(USMC) Force Reconnaissance personnel conducted during Red Flag Exercise 01-02 at 
Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) will also be included.  The overall goal of this study will be 
to apply the analysis of the WWII case study and the discussion on information systems 
to current U.S. operations and technological trends. 
 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 The research techniques used for this thesis comprise the following steps: 
 1.  Review the historical records of U.S. Forces in the ETO during WWII. 
 2.  Determine the utility of the FAC during WWII. 
 3.  Determine the information system(s) utilized by the FAC and its utility. 
 4. Conduct a literature review of information systems and their elements and 
discuss their relationship to human beings. 
 5.  Explore/observe current implementations of FACs and discuss the findings. 
 6.  Conduct interviews with current aviators and ground personnel who conduct 
the CAS and FAC mission. 
 7.  Conduct interviews with WWII fighter-bomber pilots who performed CAS and 
FAC duties. 
 8.  Based on the historical case study and current technology and concepts of 
operations, determine the relevance of the human being as an element in an information 
system. 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 The thesis is organized as follows: 
1. Chapter I: Introduction   
This chapter provides the purpose, background, scope and research methodology 
of the thesis. 
6 
 
2. Chapter II: Information Systems and Technological change   
This chapter provides a discussion of information systems and their elements.  It 
will include a look at the dynamic nature of information as it relates to individual human 
beings and their role in information systems.  A discussion of technological change and 
its relationship to information systems and organizational structure will finalize the 
chapter.  
3. Chapter III: The Interwar Period    
This chapter will look at the interwar period before CAS doctrine was formalized.  
It will also explore the events that occurred that prompted AAF and AGF officers to 
develop CAS tactics.  Included will be a brief discussion of German combined operations 
doctrine. 
4. Chapter IV: Close Air Support and The Forward Air Controller   
This chapter will examine and evaluate the introduction and evolution of CAS and 
the FAC in the ETO and the associated information systems.  First hand accounts from 
WWII fighter-bomber pilots will be included to add more insights to the study.   An 
analysis of the overall effectiveness of the FAC will be provided. 
5. Chapter V: Current Operations   
This chapter will discuss current operations and exercises and determine if any 
similarities exist between the case study and modern concepts of operations.  A brief 
discussion of current technologies and trends will be included. 
6. Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations   
This chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations concerning the 
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II. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Sun Tzu on The Art of War: 
“1. Generally, management of many is the same as 
management of few.  It is a matter of organization.” 
“2. And to control many is the same as to control few.  This 
is a matter of formations and signals” (Sun Tzu, 1971, p 
90). 
 
The WWII case study (to be discussed in a later chapter) of FACs and CAS deals 
with a military information system that resulted from technological as well as 
organizational and doctrinal changes.  In order to understand information systems in 
terms of military organization, doctrine and practice, a few questions must be answered.  
First, does military doctrine drive technological development and dictate information 
system architecture and implementation?  Does form truly follow function?  Or, does the 
opposite scenario more closely resemble reality; do technological changes spawn new 
doctrine and organizational structures?  Can or should both processes occur 
simultaneously?  Embedded in these questions are the concepts behind information 
systems theory.  According to McGrath and Hollingshead (1994), information systems 
promise three things: 
1.  Improved task performance. 
2. Overcoming time and space constraints on collaborative efforts. 
3. Increasing the range and speed of access to information (McGrath and 
Hollingshead, 1994, p 13).   
The preceding promises appeal to military commanders as they seek more 
efficient methods of conducting operations.  Some seem to take it on faith that these 
promises are guaranteed.  Improvements in information systems and technologies in the 
military have many implications.  Automation may replace many of the tasks that 
commanders perform.  However, poorly designed information systems enhanced by 
technology may overload commanders with vast quantities of information delivered at 
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unprecedented and unwieldy rates.  This problem faced commanders in the Gulf War 
(Arquilla 2001).   In a discussion about commanders applying judgment, common sense 
and the laws of probabilities in military actions involving large amounts of information, 
Clausewitz warned that, “these are difficult enough to apply when plans are drafted in an 
office, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes infinitely harder in the thick of 
fighting itself, with reports streaming in” (Clausewitz, 1989, p 117).    
 Following Clausewitz’s discussion about information overload, it will be 
important for military decision-makers and information systems designers to remember 
that there are limitations to human cognition.  As information systems are implemented in 
the military to reduce uncertainty and enhance the decision-making process, designers 
must keep in mind that, sometimes, less can be more.  The following graphs (figures 2 




Figure 2.   Information Reduces Uncertainty.  As the amount of information increases, the 
amount of certainty increases.  Clausewitz’s “fog” is reduced.  However, there is a point 
where information and certainty decouple and the relationship ceases.   
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  FOG 
Figure 3.   Less Can Be More.  As the amount of information increases, its utility increases 
to a point where increased information may induce the “fog” that Clausewitz mentions, 
thus reducing the information’s utility. 
A more ubiquitous information system may also allow commanders tighter 
control over subordinate leaders, adversely affecting their motivation and effectiveness.  
U.S. Navy Captain James FitzSimonds points out that there is no reason to expect that 
commanders will be able or willing to avoid involving themselves in actions taken by 
their subordinates, of whose circumstances they will believe they have full knowledge 
(FitzSimonds, 2000, p 5).  While new technology and information systems can benefit 
commanders, the doctrine and organizations that these systems support must be evaluated 
and changed if necessary.  Decentralized command principles may be just one of many 
possible things to change. 
There is another very important effect of changes in technology and information 
systems design.  That effect is on the human element of information systems.  Questions 
about the human element in information systems are not new in the military, but little 
research has been conducted to discover what equates to that element.  Will improved 
information systems, similar to those that Johnson and Libicki (1995) describe in 
Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge, result in more cohesive military 
operations?  Or, will information saturation confuse military cohesion?  One thing is 
certain; all military units are a combination of psychological, cultural, social and political 
subsystems.  All of these subsystems form the human element.  Organizational concerns 
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are indeed one aspect of the human element but is there more that commanders and 
designers of information systems should consider?  Is the human being an essential part 
of an information system?  Before addressing the previous questions, the components that 
make up information systems will be discussed. 
 
B. ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
“The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that 
have become, as it were, confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1989, p 
132). 
 As depicted in Figures 2 and 3, information systems, in the military context of this 
study, are designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for the decision-maker (warfighter).  
Information systems can streamline communications and allow for more efficient use of 
resources.  If recent trends persist, reliance upon information systems will increase in 
order to reduce the number of personnel necessary to man a ship or submarine, fly a 
plane, or execute and complete a mission (Wolfowitz 22 February 2002).   
When describing information systems, it is illustrative to depict information in a 
certain hierarchy.  Borrowing from Cleveland (1985), Lucky (1989), and Ackoff (1989), 





5. Wisdom      
Information systems create the opportunity to make the link between data and 
information.  In the book, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) illustrate how each element in the hierarchy builds the 
foundation for the next.  Figure 2 depicts this information pyramid: 
12 
 
Figure 4.   Information Pyramid.  (After: Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p 146). 
 
 The information pyramid is a simple, yet highly instructive, way to illustrate the 
concept of the information hierarchy.  It is important that the distinction between data and 
information remains intact.  Data is simply a sign that represents an object, a count, or a 
description that can be interpreted to produce information (Ackoff, 1989, pp 3-9).  The 
interpretation of data is the key.  The sorting, discriminating and collating of data into 
meaningful information will remain a human cognitive process.  This statement will 
always be true until computers gain a measurable level of consciousness; that discussion 
is better left to science fiction.  Human beings provide meaning to data.  When 
knowledge has been synthesized and applied to a situation, the decision-maker has 
achieved understanding.  The wisdom that follows from understanding is what is known 
as situational awareness; Napoleon called it coup d’oeil (Mackubin, 1998, p 69).   
Boland states that,  
the essence of information is revealed to us in its name.  Information is an 
inward-forming [or in-formation].  It is the change in a person from an 
encounter with data.  It is a change in the knowledge, beliefs, values or 
behavior of that person (Boland, 1987, p 363).   
He describes the process of creating information from data as “sense-making.”  Owens 
would attribute sense-making to “data fusion”.  The cognitive process of sense-making is 
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closely related to the information hierarchy.  The hierarchy of sense-making proceeds 
from awareness to understanding, followed by wisdom (Arquilla 2001; Cooper 1994 and 
Rothrock, 1994, pp 71-76).    
       The confusion over differentiating between data and information is not new.  
Many of the decision-makers in today’s military do not understand the relationship 
between data and information.  They do not grasp the concept that information is 
synthesized in the mind by data that is structured, in line and in order.  Their 
misunderstanding is carried farther to the concept of knowledge.  It is common to hear 
the words information and knowledge used synonymously in discussions about 
information systems.   The “Wall of Knowledge” is the catchphrase that military 
decision-makers use to describe a system of systems that will provide them with 
dominant knowledge or omniscience.   
The problem with the last assumption is that it relies on technology to provide 
decision-makers with knowledge, thus allowing them to bypass the sense-making 
process.  As Boland states,  
the images and metaphors we use to think about information without 
inward-forming distorts our very ability to think about the larger world of 
human affairs.  This is because we have allowed an image of information 
without in-formation to become the central, defining image of the world 
(Boland, 1987, p 364). 
The confusion over the terms data, information and knowledge may lead to the design 
and implementation of information systems that do not take into account human beings as 
operators and users of the system.  It may lead to systems that do not inform people.      
 Although not the dominant view, Boland’s article, “The In-Formation of 
Information Systems,” points out five fantasies that people develop about information.  
The first is that “information is structured data”.  Boland argues that this fantasy allows 
people to ignore the “hermeneutic problem of interpretation” (sense-making) and that it 
serves to objectify information.  Information departs the abstract and becomes a 
commodity or physical entity (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p 148).  The second fantasy 
implies that “organization is information”.  Here, the individual in an organization is 
considered moot.  The organization is information belief assumes that the automated 
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manipulation of structured data can substitute human beings throughout any 
organizational hierarchy.  It also assumes that information has a ubiquitous presence in 
all things (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p 147; Berkeley, 1949, pp 10-17).  In 1953 a 
Fortune magazine article linked this scientific approach to information, pioneered by 
communications engineer Claude Shannon, to the conceptualization of DNA (Bello, 
1953, pp 136-410).  
 Boland’s third fantasy is that “information is power”.  This fantasy, as is true with 
all the others, argues that the information system designer can manipulate both power and 
information while excluding the human being from the process.  Therefore, the 
information system ought to determine what is information and wield power based on 
that determination (usually a human relational phenomenon).  The fourth fantasy, that 
“information is intelligence”, takes the unmistakable position that human beings and their 
sense-making abilities are no longer relevant in information systems.  This fantasy takes 
on the flavor of Owens’ system of systems view. 
 The fifth and final fantasy is that “information is perfectable”.  Here, the faith of 
decision-makers is won.  If information can be perfectable, then there can be no mistakes. 
It is from this perceived perfectability of information that the reliance on technology and 
information systems as a panacea to correct present and future shortcomings grows. 
However, this fantasy falls apart when it comes into contact with the real, unpredictable 
world.  Clausewitz calls this friction (Clausewitz, 1989, pp 119-120).  All five fantasies 
rely on the premise that human beings, with their differences and problems, are not a part 
of the information system.  That premise is “doomed to failure, because information is 
not a thing, it is a skilled human accomplishment” (Giddens, 1979, p 373).   
Unfortunately, by fantasizing that information is structured data, we deny 
the importance of dialogue as the basis for all human understanding.  By 
taking structured data seriously as a substitute for information we deny the 
universal hermeneutic problem that we all continuously confront: the 
problem of engaging in dialogue in order to gain understanding and make 
sense of the world (Boland, 1987, p 371). 
Boland’s views are not predominant, merely expressive of one side of the debate.  
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (1997) offer three different views of information in 
their book, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age.  The first 
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two views of information that they present are fairly straightforward and readily 
understandable.  The first view defines information in terms of the message it conveys.  It 
follows the information hierarchy in that its base is raw data that can be arranged to form 
meaning.  This meaning is placed in context to build upon the knowledge and 
understanding of human beings.  The result is the information pyramid that is depicted in 
figure 4.  The entire pyramid is called information (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p 146).  
I would argue that by labeling the pyramid “Information,” many military leaders confuse 
the terms data, information, knowledge and wisdom as meaning the same things. 
The second view characterizes information as a medium.  It takes the engineer’s 
approach in that it is concerned with the creation, storage, transmission and reception of 
the information (or signal).  This view of information is less about content and more 
about signal theory.  The medium school of thought focuses on encryption, propagation, 
integrity and reliability of the signal.  This view of information is very interesting as more 
and more of our new and current systems rely upon connectivity.  The field of signals 
analysis and manipulation will continue to make this view of information relavent  
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, pp 147-148).     
The third view of information is a more challenging concept, almost 
metaphysical.  This view categorizes information as a physical property that all things 
contain.   It adds information to the list of essential components (i.e. matter and energy) 
that are resident in all things.  This view is especially relavent for the military.  When 
viewed from this standpoint, the information content of a round moving down range can 
be either highly destructive or highly instructive to the enemy.  In another context, the 
information content of potential targets that can be sensed from the new, highly- 
sensitive, space-based systems exemplifies this view (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, pp 
148-149). 
Still another view of information comes from William H. McNeill (1982) in his 
book, The Pursuit of Power.  In his book, McNeill examines 1,000 years of societies and 
their militaries.  He points to the technological development of weapons in WWII as a 
watershed moment in history.  This improvement in weapons systems increased the 
information that is “embedded” in weapons.  McNeill wrote, “The results of systematic 
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application of scientific knowledge to weapons design rivaled transnational organization 
in importance at the time.”  He went on to say, “scientists, technologists, design 
engineers, and efficiency experts were summoned to the task of improving existing 
weapons and inventing new ones on a scale far greater than ever before” (McNeill, 1982, 
p 357). 
McNeill believes the concept of “complete weapons systems” emerged during this 
time.  A complete weapons system meant that everything had to be standardized, from 
ammunition to same speed tanks, infantry carriers and self-propelled artillery.  
Everything had to flow, from production to operation.  Essentially, increasing the 
embedded information in weapons allowed for standardization.  McNeill pointed out that 
radar was one such system that represented a major innovation of weapons systems.  He 
added to the list: jet airplanes, proximity fuses, guided missiles and ultimately, the atomic 
bomb (McNeill, 1982, p 359).    
 
C. TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
 Technological innovations and their resulting implementation have improved 
military capabilities and lethality to a great extent.  Military information systems benefit 
from technological advances.  These technological advances result in changes in 
hardware that produce higher-paced operations and increased demands upon “speed of 
command” (Cebrowski, 1998, p 32).  At the rate that new information systems are 
installed and removed and reinstalled on today’s military platforms, the challenge that 
faces us is not technological, but organizational.  The test will be how best to reorganize 
people around these new information systems in order to reap their full potentialities.      
Information technology plays a crucial role in business reengineering, but 
that is easily miscast.  Modern, state of the art information technology is 
part of any reengineering effort, an essential enabler since it permits 
companies to reengineer business processes.  But, merely throwing 
computers at an existing business problem does not cause it to be 
reengineered.  In fact the misuse of technology can block reengineering 
altogether by reinforcing old ways of thinking and old behavior patterns 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993, p 83). 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, military organizations are microcosm of 
society with their own specific cultural identities.  They each have their own customs, 
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hierarchies, politics and psychological views.  Elting Morison, writing about innovation 
in the U.S. Navy, noted that the adoption of new technologies poses a threat (and may 
even eliminate) existing “mores and structures” within the Navy (Morison, 1966, pp 17-
44).  Cultural resistance to change is alive and well in the Navy, but it is a reality in all 
organizations. 
It is clear from existing business and management science literature that for the 
introduction of new technologies to be successful, changes in personnel requirements will 
occur along with the centralization or decentralization of organizational structures.  
According to Dodge, Webb and Christ (1999), the effects from these changes may take 
seven or more years to be fully realized (Dodge, 1999, p 11). This delay, from a 
technology’s first introduction to its routine operational use, has been a common trend 
when previous military innovations were first introduced to a military (Arquilla 2001).  I 
would argue that this is due, in part, to cultural and organization resistance to change and 
the lag that occurs when new doctrine is developed to meet the technology.  This is 
possibly not the best way to go about transformation. 
Coordination theory is another way to look at the introduction of new technology, 
information systems and organizational change.  This is an interactionist view that 
contends that both organizational requirements and information technology come 
together to create organizational change (Crowston and Malone, 1994, p 7).  This view is 
very similar to Harold Leavitt’s Diamond as seen below in figure 5: 
                                                    STRUCTURE 
 
 
          TASK                TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
                                                                     PEOPLE 
Figure 5.   Leavitt’s Diamond.  (From: Leavitt, 1965). 
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Leavitt’s diamond illustrates how no part of an information system is isolated from 
individual or organizational behaviors.  Basically, every element of organizational life 
affects every other.  If you change the technology or information system, you will change 
the organizational structure, the people and the task, etc. (Wilson 7). 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter attempted to explain some of the popular concepts relating to 
information and information systems.  Another purpose of this chapter was to link these 
concepts of information systems to current military thinking about the efficacy of 
information in light of the RMA.  Hopefully, enough of a distinction was made between 
data and information so that the concept of information, followed by the concepts of 
knowledge, understanding and wisdom, are understood to be in the human realm vice the 
technology realm.  Technology is a great enabler, allowing military decision-makers to be 
more efficient and better informed.  Technology has also had a significant influence on 
military organization and doctrine.  What is important to understand is that technology 
can improve our ability to know, understand and gain wisdom, but it is doubtful that it 
will ever replace these human capabilities.   
 In the following chapters, the previous concepts will be discussed as they relate to 
the development of CAS and the use of the FAC prior to and during WWII.  The CAS-
FAC information system will be examined and, finally, critiqued based on its 
effectiveness.  The results of this examination will be applied to the current RMA and its 
regard for information systems.  Important points that will, hopefully, be uncovered 
include the observation that innovation occurred after a logical analysis of strategic 
requirements or for other reasons; that technological advances shaped military 
capabilities (technology drove doctrine) or not; that political and cultural considerations 
within the military organization shaped the course of innovation or not.     
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III. THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The interwar years (1919-1939) were an interesting time in military aviation.  The 
pace of technological advances in aircraft design and communications quickened after 
World War One.  At the close of the war, the U.S. Army Air Corps viewed CAS (then 
called general air support of ground forces) as a primary mission (Mortenson, 1987, p 6).  
Although the U.S. entered WWI late, its air forces began to hammer out and apply CAS 
principles with positive results, specifically, in the St. Mihiel Offensive in September 
1918 (Fogleman, 1971, 81).  In this battle, thousands of American and French planes 
were used to strafe German positions and retreating troops and equipment.   
The U.S. was not alone in its development of CAS.  Germany also conducted air 
support of ground forces in the final months of WWI.  They places liaison officers in the 
trenches and even attempted using radios to direct its aircraft against the enemy (Hallion, 
1989, p 14).  Analyzing the paths that the two nations took, in terms of defining and 
developing CAS technology and doctrine, can serve as a valuable lesson for today’s 
military decision-makers. 
This chapter will focus, primarily, on the U.S. military during the interwar period.  
It will show how organization, culture, technology and attitudes about innovation 
affected its readiness to conduct CAS upon entering WWII.  A brief discussion about 
German development of CAS will be included in contrast to the U.S. effort.  Although 
German innovation during the interwar period is not the focus of this case study, its 
differences with and influence on U.S. innovation are relevant to the discussion. 
            
B. PATH TO INNOVATION 
1. The U.S. Effort 
Immediately following WWI, the U.S. appeared to be on a clear path to develop 
an effective CAS doctrine.  American successes in the battles of 1918 inspired Lt. Col. 
William C. Sherman’s “Tentative Manual for the Employment of Air Service” and 
General William “Billy” Mitchell’s “Provisional Manual of Operations of Air Units.”  
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These two manuals were written immediately after the war and attempted to record the 
experiences of the Air Service (later becoming the Air Corps in 1926).  Both Sherman 
and Mitchell agreed that the use of air power on the front lines could be decisive in battle 
(Maurer, 1978, p 399). 
For a brief period before the end of WWI (and immediately after) there was an 
intense effort to create and perfect CAS principles and develop aircraft for that mission.  
Air power was gaining prominence in military affairs.  The potential of air power in war 
was, it seemed, limitless.  The efficacy of air power did continue to grow, but it was in 
the direction of strategic air power, not CAS.  In 1921, the Army created the 3rd Attack 
Group to focus on developing the CAS mission and its doctrine (Kennett, 1990, 43).  The 
3rd Attack Group was to be a ground attack unit made up of four, former border 
surveillance squadrons. 
Slowly but surely, the 3rd Attack Group withered away under the interwar era 
budgetary cuts.  Two of the original four squadrons were deactivated, while the personnel 
in the remaining two were severely cut (Muller, 1996, 175).  All innovation to the CAS 
mission ceased due to the lack of funding and neglect of the 3rd Attack Group.  The Army 
Air Forces (AAF) simply ignored the CAS mission. 
The belief that air power’s potential was limitless was not to last, at least not for 
CAS.  Throughout most of the interwar years, until 1936, there was very limited 
development of CAS aircraft and even less discussion about doctrine.  It was as if the 
lessons from WWI were forgotten or ignored.  There was one area in military aviation 
that was being emphasized: strategic aerial bombardment.  There were many 
organizational, cultural and political reasons why CAS took a back seat to strategic 
bombing.  Primarily, the U.S.’ geographically isolated location motivated the AAF to 
begin developing plans and doctrine to provide for the defense of the country from a sea-
based invasion.  Attack from Canada or Mexico seem unlikely.  The most conceivable 
attack would likely originate from a South or Central American country used as a jump-
off point.  The AAF’s use of this scenario as a valid reason to pursue long-range strategic 
bombing vice CAS was debatable, but it held.  
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 Pursuing the coastal defense mission, the AAF placed more emphasis on the 
development of aircraft and doctrine to support long-range bombing and bomber 
protection.  In Gen. Mitchell’s words, the U.S. entered the “aeronautical era” and many 
military (AAF) planners believed strategic bombers could win wars almost independently 
(Mitchell, 1925).  Ground forces would not be needed to defeat an enemy.  The mentality 
of “air power exceptionalism”, winning a war without using ground forces, reigned 
supreme in the interwar period (DeSeversky, 1942).  Heavy and medium bomber 
development, as well as the development of fighter aircraft for their protection, was the 
focus of AAF innovation efforts.  In this vein, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) 
focused its instruction on the use of long-range bombers, independent strike forces and 
industrial targeting (Mortenson, 1987, p 8).    
Thinking about CAS and development of CAS aircraft did not begin again until 
the possibility of war with Germany and Japan appeared likely.  In the early to mid 
1920s, the AAF could not look to the international military community for innovative 
ideas since the 3rd Attack group was the only military unit of its type in the world 
(Kennett, 1990, p 45).  CAS was such a new area of warfare that there was no historical 
record or corporate knowledge, other than from the last part of WWI, to draw from.  To 
say that the AAF lacked any resources from which to develop CAS doctrine would be 
incorrect.  In a presentation to the Army War College in 1929, Maj. Ross Rowell 
(USMC) presented a lecture entitled, “Experience with the Air Service in Minor 
Warfare” (Rowell, 1929). 
Maj. Ross Rowell presented the experiences that the Marines had with CAS in 
their operations in Nicaragua.  Ross explained how the Marines used airplanes as artillery 
and employed them in extremely close proximity of their own forces.  They were able to 
break-up enemy ambushes and fly escort missions for columns.  Probably due to their 
small force size and scarce resources, the Marines had no choice but to maximize the 
airplane’s utility on the battlefield.  Despite the useful experiences of the Marines in 
Nicaragua and their willingness to share them with the AAF, there is little mention of 
them in ACTS texts from that time (Kennett, 1990, p 45).  The lack of interest in the 
Marines’ experiences is reflected in a comment that Gen. Mitchell made in 1930.  
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This branch of aviation [CAS] will have most of its application in the 
future against what are termed partisan or irregular troops, and as are 
found in Asia, Africa, Mexico and Central America, that is those not 
equipped with large air forces and which do not move in large numbers 
but in comparatively small mobile detachments (Mitchell, 1930, p 280).  
It is interesting that the AAF chose to innovate almost solely in the area of long-
range strategic bombing in light of its positive experiences with CAS in WWI and the 
USMC’s experiences in Nicaragua.  The reasons for this choice are varied but include 
political and cultural differences within the U.S. Army as well as technological 
influences.  These reasons will be discussed later in this chapter.    Before these are 
expounded upon, a short discussion of German innovations in aviation during the 
interwar period will follow. 
2. The German Effort 
The Germans also used CAS tactics in the latter part of WWI.  They converted 
their schutzstaffeln, protection units used to escort reconnaissance aircraft, into 
schlactstaffeln, or battle units.  The schlactstaffeln would attack enemy ground units at 
decisive points during a battle in groups of three to nine airplanes, a staffel (Muller, 1996, 
p 147; Kennett, 1990, p 19).  This practice was different from that of the allies, whose 
planes would fly independently looking for targets of opportunity (this tactic would 
change, reflecting the German method, later in the war).  In 1917, the Germans were 
using liaison officers in the front-line trenches to coordinate air strikes.  They 
accomplished this by using radios (Hoeppner, 1921, pp 114-118).  Arguably, the 
Germans possessed the best doctrine for CAS during the war.  Preparations for the 
Michael Offensive are evidence of superior German doctrine (Corum, 1992, p 70).  The 
aircraft that the Germans used for this mission were not technologically advanced but 
their employment of them was revolutionary (Neumann, 1920, pp 80-81). 
Although both the German and American innovations in CAS proceeded swiftly 
in the final stages of WWI, the Germans seemed to learn the lessons of the war better 
than the Americans.  The fact that Germany was placed under tight restrictions, enforced 
by the Treaty of Versailles, made any innovations in military aviation difficult in the 
interwar period (during the 1920’s, the Germans did conduct some secret experiments in 
the Soviet Union (Muller, 1996, p 158)).  This persisted until Adolph Hitler and the Nazi 
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Party came to power in 1933.  Nonetheless, the Germans conducted quite thorough 
studies of what went on in the air war during WWI.  Perhaps the restraints of Versailles 
put the German military leadership on a path that forced them to theorize about the 
applications of air power rather than focusing on technological innovation.  As a result of 
the studies, the German approach to air power sharply contrasted with that of the 
Americans.  The Germans did not place one element (i.e. strategic bombing) over another 
(i.e. CAS).  Murray (1996), states that the Germans recognized the importance of air 
superiority, the interdependence of air and ground forces on the battlefield, and that the 
priorities of air power should shift based on the given circumstances. 
The Spanish Civil War was another area where that the Germans sought to 
innovate in the air.  The Luftwaffe participated in the civil war by means of an 
autonomous component called the Condor Legion.  The Condor Legion, consisting of 
relatively few aircraft, did a great deal of CAS doctrine testing under Wolfram von 
Richthofen.  Although the Germans began using CAS in WWI, Wolfram’s legion was 
credited with making great advances in the close support concept (Muller, 1996, pp 161-
162).  Many nations sent representatives and observers, who wrote a great deal about the 
events of the war, but the U.S. did not.  While Germany benefited from its participation 
in Spain’s civil war, the U.S. missed the opportunity.    
Historical records and lessons-learned formed the foundation for German air 
innovation.  The realities of WWI and the Spanish Civil war air operations informed the 
military decision-makers and theorists in post-war Germany.  Unfortunately, this was not 
true for the Americans.  Though the U.S. did enjoy success in WWI, the lessons 
concerning the use of air power in support of ground forces were nearly forgotten by the 
late 1930’s.  The differences between the U.S. and German interwar periods were largely 
due to political/cultural and organizational relationships.  The next few sections will shed 
light on these topics.  
      
C. CULTURE 
It is interesting to consider why CAS did not attract more attention from the AAF.  
After all, the AAF was a part of the U.S. Army.  Why would it not want to develop 
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doctrine that directly supported its service?  The American Air Service used applications 
of CAS principles quite effectively during the final stages of WWI (St. Mihiel Offensive 
in September 1918) and by the USMC in Nicaragua.  Why were the lessons of the 
previous wars ignored or overlooked?  Part of the answer to these questions stems from 
the culture of the AAF and AGF. 
As previously mentioned, the AAF was ultimately interested in strategic 
bombardment.  Its main efforts were in the perfection of long-range bombers and their 
associated doctrines.  Fighter aircraft, whose mission would be to protect the bombers, 
were also a part of the AAF vision.  It is arguable that the AAF latched onto the strategic 
bombing mission as a way of separating itself from the AGF.  The strategic bombing 
mission would be independent of AGF control.  The AAF did not want to be a 
subordinate element of the AGF.  In the years immediately after WWI most of the senior 
Army leadership were traditional ground officers.  By 1930, the AAF avoided any 
discussion or notion of CAS innovation because of the link it held to ground forces.  
Culturally and organizationally, the AAF was becoming more separate and distinct due to 
its role in strategic air power (Mortenson, 1987, pp 8-9). 
The complexity of air-ground operations requires that joint exercises be 
conducted.  This, however, did not occur very much during the interwar period.  
According to Gen. Mitchell’s and Col. Sherman’s doctrinal writings from WWI, air 
operations need to be closely coordinated with ground operations to be effective.  Again, 
the AGF and AAF rarely conducted joint operations to work out procedures (Fogleman, 
1971, p 152).  Commenting on the rarity of CAS exercises, Gen. Earle Partridge said that 
3rd Attack Group exercises “were few and far between.”  He also said that, “Socially, we 
knew a lot of them [3rd Attack Group officers] we ran into those people at parties and so 
on, but as for getting together to talk tactics, no.”  When asked about how the commander 
of the 3rd Attack Group was getting his doctrine, Gen. Partridge said, “he was 
manufacturing it (Sturm and Ahmann, 1974).”    
Contrary to the AAF point of view, the AGF saw the role of the AAF as one of 
direct support of the ground forces.  The AGF viewed the AAF as a subordinate and 
supporting branch of the AGF, whose commanders should be able to exercise control 
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over aviation assets.  Experience from WWI and analysis of German CAS activities after 
1933 convinced AGF commanders that CAS was an extremely important capability.  
Specifically, the Germans’ use of the dive-bomber in Poland and France convinced AGF 
that it needed a CAS capability (Hallion, 1989, p 132).  It was apparent to the AGF 
commanders that CAS could provide them with substantial increases in firepower on the 
battlefield. 
The argument between the AAF and AGF commanders stifled almost all 
innovation in CAS.  Culturally the AAF and AGF were miles apart.  There was however, 
an open debate on CAS or, more directly, who should control aviation assets.  
Unfortunately, the debate over doctrine only yielded field manuals (FM 31-35) that 
merely re-stated each side’s position rather than focusing on training and procedures.  
Training Regulation TR 440-15 was promulgated on 15 October 1935 and attempted to 
bring the AAF and AGF positions a little closer together to help build a coherent 
doctrine.  Although TR 440-15 did make concessions on both sides of the argument, no 
resolution was reached.  It was not until the publication of FM 100-20 in 1943, which 
will be discussed later, that any real progress occurred in CAS innovation. 
              
D. TECHNOLOGY 
The interwar period saw little change in aviation technology in the realm of CAS.  
As previously mentioned, the Germans used radios in WWI to direct the pilots to targets 
of interest.  The American Air Service also used radios but with little success.  The radios 
were too cumbersome to operate while flying the airplanes.  As WWII approached, 
communications development was revisited.  Tests indicated that airborne reconnaissance 
was more effective than ground-based direction because of the low reliability of radio 
transmission.  However, the testing of communications prior to the U.S. entering the war 
was not adequate.  An Army War College text of 1937-38 advised: 
Airplane radio sets are most valuable for training.  Their combat 
employment is prejudicial to security and surprise.  If not carefully 
maintained, they are noisy and conversation is difficult.  Voice 
communication is slow and difficult.  The best principle for the use of 
radio is “Silence is Golden.”  (Carlisle Barracks, 1937-1938, p 44)   
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Shortly after the war, the Air Service sought a heavily armored airplane that could 
be used in the CAS role.  They wanted an airplane that would maximize firepower on the 
battlefield.  In 1921, Boeing built the GA-1 (Ground Attack) airplane.  The Engineering 
Division of the Air Service designed the airframe and weaponry; the GA-1 was a twin-
engine, armored plane with a 37-mm hub-fired cannon.  The GA-1 was too heavy from 
the ¼-inch armor plating and handled poorly (Munson and Swanboro, 1972, p 21).  The 
Air Service’s first attempt at technological innovation was a failure.  So was the second; 
the GA-2 was also a failure.  However, the Air Service identified it needs and 
requirements and then sought out the technology that could meet them.  This was 
arguably a reasonable way to go about innovation. 
As the interwar years progressed, budgetary cuts deepened.  The 3rd Attack Group 
had to abandon all hopes of fielding an armored CAS platform.  Instead, the 3rd had to 
settle for DH-4 observation planes.  These airplanes were previously employed as border 
surveillance aircraft along the Mexican border; they had engines designed during WWI.  
An officer attached to the 3rd Attack Group complained, “there is a total of fourteen DH 
planes in the attack air force of this country” (Fogleman, 1971, p 81).  Needless to say, 
the training and doctrine development was disappointing since the DH-4 could not carry 
both machine guns and bombs. 
As the next several years passed, no improvements in CAS technology were 
made.  Instead, indirect support of ground forces was being pursued.  A 1930 ACTS text 
stated that “the air force does not attack objectives in the battlefield or in the immediate 
proximity thereof, except in most unusual circumstances (ACTS, 1930, pp 70, 82).”  As a 
result of the debate between attack and indirect support, finding a suitable airplane for the 
mission was difficult.  The DH-4s were replaced by another observation plane, the A-3 (a 
modified Curtiss 0-1).  Later, after continued debate, the Curtiss A-12, followed by the 
Northrop A-17, were introduced.  Neither of these craft were particularly well suited to 
ground attack.  They were lightweight and unarmored.  It was not until the development 
of twin-engine airplanes that any progress was made in CAS technology.  The Douglas 
A-20 was one such plane that could carry one ton of bombs, six guns and travel twelve 
hundred miles. 
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The introduction of the A-20 brought some hope to the 3rd Attack Group and for 
continued development of CAS doctrine.  The A-20 had the potential of being a great 
asset to commanders in the field.  The ACTS, after seeing the potential of the A-20, 
changed its class designator from attack to light bombardment.  Doing this appeased 
those who desired air power to be capable of hitting targets well behind the lines.  
Unfortunately, the technical innovations in the A-20 did not translate into innovations in 
supporting ground forces in the CAS role.  There was no formal doctrine, not even a field 
manual, which described the proper employment of the A-20.  The ACTS’ text, Light 
Bombardment Aviation, dated 15 January 1940 made this reservation: 
To use this force on the battlefield to supplement and increase the 
firepower of ground arms is decidedly and incorrect employment of this 
class of aviation, since it would neglect the more distant and vital 
objectives (Finney, n.d., 157).            
After the breakout of war in September 1939, the Air Corps was finally prompted 
to aggressively develop CAS technology and doctrine.  The reason for the new sense of 
urgency was the highly publicized performance of the German Stuka dive-bomber in 
Poland and France.  These events served as an external stimulus for change.  Although 
the performance of the Stuka was questionable when facing moderate enemy air 
defenses, Gen. Arnold went forward with a program to acquire dive-bombers for its use.  
The Air Corps took delivery of modified Navy SBDs, they were designated the A-24 
(Kennett, 1990, p 52).  Gen Arnold, sending a letter to Gen. Andrews (Commander of the 
newly consolidated strike force) stressed “the vital importance of developing tactics and 
techniques necessary in rendering close air support (Arnold, 9 August 1940).”  In this 
case, technology was adopted before the doctrine but at least there was an attempt to 
provide doctrine, unlike the A-20 case. 
In the months that followed, many exercises were conducted to test doctrine, 
aircraft, munitions, radios and tactics.  These exercises were plagued by a lack of 
equipment and general attention from the AAF.  Determining how close bombing should 
occur to friendly troops was one of the objectives of the exercises.  Tests indicated that 
the distance was dependent upon the skill of the pilot and that troops could not effectively 
29 
direct CAS aircraft or designate targets.  Those targets that were designated by ground 
personnel were considered not profitable (Kennett, 1990, p 53). 
     
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
The organizational structure of the U.S. Army and its air force played a key role 
in the ascendancy of strategic bombing doctrine and the neglect of the CAS mission.  In 
the beginning of the interwar period, the Army naturally focused a lion’s share of its 
attention on ground forces and acknowledged only a secondary concern for its air forces.  
The Army bureaucracy was not inclined, or even capable, of viewing the air force as 
anything but a supporting branch whose sole purpose was to support the ground forces.   
This is understandable considering that the leadership within the Army was made up of 
former ground commanders.  Aviation was still in its early days. 
As WWII grew closer and improvements in air bombardment capability increased 
(range and payload), the AAF became more important to U.S. military strategy.  In 1935, 
the General Staff of the Army gave the AAF the authority to organize a combat ready air 
force.  The Air Corps formed the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force in order to 
create a combat force (Greer, 1955, pp 44-106).  This organizational change did allow the 
AAF more autonomy but it was still subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff.  However, as 
the AAF grew, its leadership became more prominent in the military strategy debate.  The 
growing voice of the air branch within the U.S. Army began to attract more attention 
from the ground-centered Army.  Eventually, the AAF achieved enough influence to 
direct its own course (i.e. strategic air operations vice CAS).  It was evident that the AAF 
and the AGF were still headed in different philosophical and doctrinal directions. 
Ending the debate between the AAF and AGF once and for all, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt called for a meeting of the top Army leadership in the White house.  On 14 
November 1938, the president stated that he wanted a force that would be capable of 
protecting the Western Hemisphere from the actions of Germany and Italy; he said that 
the Army Air Corps should be that force (Watson, 1950, pp 132-146).  As a result of 
Roosevelt’s order, Congress significantly increased the AAF budget.  The AAF was now 
able to effectively maintain its position on the proper use of air power in support of 
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ground forces.  It could do this because of its new-found prominence in the War 
Department and increased budget from Congress. 
Shortly after the budgetary increases of 1939 and 1940, General Arnold 
designated Col. William Lynd as the first head of the newly formed Air Support Section 
of the new Air Force Combat Command.  Arnold made this organizational change to 
improve air-ground cooperation and to give ground commanders an advocate for air 
support.  This all occurred when the AAF’s attention was shifting even more in the 
direction of strategic air warfare (Arnold, 1949, pp 177-180).   
Organizational changes in the U.S. Army were occurring at a quick rate as the 
nation prepared for war.  Commanders on both sides of the CAS debate understood that 
the AAF mission was bigger than merely supporting the ground forces.  The senior 
leadership in the AAF and AGF, Generals Marshall, McNair and Arnold, realized that the 
AAF was becoming its own service but did not want to separate the AAF from the AAF 
while war loomed.  It was decided to reserve that change until after the war.  In the mean- 
time, the AAF organized itself so that it could conduct strategic air operations while still 
supporting the ground forces. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
At the end of WWI, the future of CAS seemed to be promising in the Army Air 
Service.  The use of air power on the battlefield had yielded great results in 1918.  
Unfortunately, the U.S., for bureaucratic and budgetary reasons, did not continue the 
development of CAS doctrine and technology until just prior to and during the next world 
war.  This late development of CAS would have serious effects on the battlefield.  These 
























IV. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND THE FORWARD AIR 
CONTROLLER 
A. INTRODUCTION: WWII 
The early years of America’s involvement in WWII were costly.  In Tunisia 
during the 1st months of 1943, the ground force commander had direct control over the air 
support command attached to his unit.  This is what U.S. doctrine dictated.  The AAF was 
still under the yoke of the AGF.  As a result of this command structure, there were no 
coordinated efforts to gain air superiority.  Instead, the Luftwaffe had control of the air.  
AAF losses were high and made the conduct of CAS impossible (Lester, 1997, p 10). 
The unacceptably high losses of friendly forces in Tunisia made commanders 
realize that the command and control of AAF units needed to be changed.  Undoubtedly, 
one of the best examples of the poor employment of AAF assets occurred during the 
Battle of Kasserine Pass.  The American First Armored division was utterly defeated, 
losing 50 percent of its tanks, by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s armored units supported 
by the Luftwaffe.  Few AAF sorties supported this battle.  How could the Allies be 
defeated so easily when their air forces outnumbered those of the Axis by three to one?  
Inter-Allied bickering was one reason for the defeat; Gen. Pete Quesada said of the 
infighting, “I was aware of the discord and rather distressed by it.  It resulted in complete 
chaos in North Africa” (Hughes, 1995, p 86).  Unfortunately, the allies were in the 
process of changing the command and control (C2) of the AAF units when the Kasserine 
battle took place (Playfair, 1966, p 303). 
Experience in Tunisia clearly shows that a smaller force with a good C2 system 
can defeat a numerically superior force without an adequate C2 system.  Just a month 
before the Kasserine Pass debacle, Chruchill, Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff came together for the Casablanca Conference on 20 January 1943 (Syrett, 1995, p 
170).  The purpose of this conference was to rearrange the command structure of the 
Allied forces in the Mediterranean.  It worked.  Each day, the Allied air forces’ C2 and 
tactics got better against the logistically taxed and thinning Axis air and ground forces 
(Air Ministry, 1983, pp 249-54).       
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Before FM 100-20, innovations in the strategic bombing mission were sought 
after while innovations in CAS were at a standstill.  This trend continued after the 
introduction of FM 100-20, “Command and Employment of Air Power,” on 21 July 
1943, but improvements in CAS slowly began to surface despite the inter-service 
argument.  The U.S. entry into the war was a major catalyst for change.  Although CAS 
needed a great deal of development and refinement, the three distinct missions of a 
tactical air force, defined in FM 100-20, proved to be completely sound during air-ground 
operations in the ETO.  The three missions were: to gain and maintain air superiority, 
disrupt hostile lines of communication, and to destroy enemy troops and materiel on the 
fighting front in cooperation with forward ground forces (Kohn and Harahan, 1984, p 7).  
The lessons learned from Kasserine Pass and other battles in Northern Africa 
were slowly building the doctrine and tactics of CAS.  This incremental process of 
doctrinal development continued in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns.  However, despite 
the Casablanca Conference and the introduction of FM 100-20, the AAF and AGF were 
still not working together effectively; organizational resistance to change, added to the 
lack of agreed upon doctrine, was probably the culprit.  Speaking about the lack of air-
ground coordination prior to the invasion of Sicily, General Omar Bradley complained, 
It certainly was inexcusable.  We were preparing to assault an enemy 
beach in darkness, knowing full well that a panzer division was ready to 
pounce on us.  It would have been immensely comforting to know 
positively that our massive air power would be overhead to help us if we 
needed it…We were soon to discover that our fears were not groundless.  
The air support provided us on Sicily was scandalously casual, careless 
and ineffective (Bradley and Blair, 1983, p 178).    
By the end of the war in the ETO, after tremendous effort and CAS development, 
the relationship between the AAF and AGF had gotten decidedly better. The air and 
ground components of the Army, in conjunction with the Navy, had to work together in 
order to be successful against the Nazis.  Field Commander of the 12th Army Group, 
General Omar N. Bradley, experiencing a complete change of heart, emphasized this 
relationship in a statement he made in Wiesbaden, Germany, on 15 July 1945: 
The axiomatic requirement that victory can only be achieved by the 
attainment of supremacy on the land, sea and in the air has never been so 
fully proven as in this total defeat of an enemy who never controlled the 
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sea, who tried to substitute strategic artillery for a defeat in the air, and 
whose armed forces were crushed and homeland over-run by the 
combined power of our supremacy in all these three elements (Kohn, 
1946, p 1). 
It is interesting to note that the doctrine writers in Washington D.C. were reluctant 
to give the CAS mission a high degree of overall importance in the air power scheme of 
things.  They were fixated on the development of strategic bombing doctrine.  However, 
the air and ground commanders in the ETO saw how effective the use of air power could 
be on the battlefield.  Both the AAF and AGF in the ETO worked diligently to innovate 
the CAS mission.  The innovations that occurred in CAS were a mixture of “current 
technology/new concepts of operations” and “new technology/new concepts of 
operations” (Arquilla 2001).  The AAF and AGF took the existing technology of the 
time, the aircraft and its information systems, and slowly developed new methods of 
employing them.  They also incorporated new technologies, as they surfaced, into the 
existing systems and developed new concepts of operations as needed. 
An important point to consider is that a culture of change and innovation was 
afoot in the U.S. Army.  New ideas were no longer just nice to think about, ETO 
commanders enthusiastically sought them out and tested them in the field.  In essence, 
changes in CAS were coming from the bottom up, despite the reluctance of the AAF 
commanders in Washington D.C.  Incrementally, the AAF and AGF developed new 
doctrine, tactics, communications and signaling methods to help U.S. pilots locate and 
identify enemy units while, hopefully, avoiding friendly troops.  Unfortunately, this was 
not always the case.  As the AAF and AGF struggled to defeat the Germans, while 
simultaneously developing CAS doctrine and tactics, several hundred American troops 
were killed and wounded by friendly fire (most of them in the St. Lô breakout attempt) 
(Craven and Cate, 1948, p 233-234).                     
 
B. AIR-GROUND TEAM, A CULTURE UNTO ITS OWN 
It was not long after the introduction of FM100-20 that the once opposed AAF 
and AGF started to envision themselves as an air-ground team.  Close cooperation 
between AAF and AGF commanders in the ETO was essential to make the CAS mission 
work well and reduce friendly fire casualties.  The problem of how to make the two 
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forces work together efficiently, with the greatest lethality to the enemy, was the over-
riding issue facing the commanders.   
The Ninth Air Force, the numbered air force responsible for all close air support 
missions in the ETO, devised and maintained an extensive air-ground exchange program.  
This program was not just a simple liaison program; the exchange of thousands of officer 
and enlisted personnel between both air and ground commands was highly successful 
(Kohn and Harahan, 1984, p106).  The exchange program allowed the personnel involved 
to develop a sense of understanding about their sister branch’s capabilities and 
limitations.  This, more than anything, fostered a greater atmosphere of cooperation.  The 
creation of air-ground cooperation parties (AGCP) was just one of these exchanges that 
allowed the AAF and AGF to conduct combined operations more effectively.  The AGCP 
was made up of Air Corps advisors who were placed with ground units (Headquarters, 
MAAF, 1945). 
The AGF and AAF commanders understood their roles to be members of an 
overwhelming team whose mission it was to crush the outer defenses of “Fortress 
Europe.”  Once the invasion of Normandy was complete, the air-ground team focused its 
efforts on the breakout from Normandy and subsequent defeat of Germany.  The 
combination of the 12th Army Group and Ninth Air Force resulted in an unstoppable 
team.  The pace of the thrust through Europe was aggressive (after the breakout of 
Normandy); when asked about protecting the flanks of such a fast moving army, Patton 
said,   
…this lack of defense is immaterial.  If I had worried about flanks, I could 
never have fought the war.  Also, I was convinced that our Air Service 
could locate any groups of enemy large enough to be a serious threat, and 
then I could always pull something out of the hat to drive them back while 
the Air Force in the meantime delayed their further advance (Patton, 1947, 
p 112-13). 
Defying most expert opinion, this air-ground team quickly destroyed the once 
invincible German army in Western Europe.  However, this victory came out of great 




C. ST. LÔ 
After the invasion of Normandy, Allied movement to the East was halted.  
Difficult terrain (hedgerow country), muddy conditions, and stiff German resistance 
made further progress impossible.  Gen. Bradley devised a plan called Cobra to proceed 
in conjunction with Gen. Montgomery’s diversionary plan called Goodwood.  The goal 
of Cobra was to effect the breakout of Normandy.  The breakout was planned for the St. 
Lô area.  Cobra was to rely upon the saturation bombing of an area of German 
concentration that was a rectangle three and a half miles wide and one and a half miles 
deep.  The St. Lô-Périers road marked the Northern side of this rectangle.  The AAF had 
to be very accurate in the saturation bombing because American troops were going to be 
advanced to the St. Lô-Périers road for the jump-off and breakout through St. Lô area 
(Bradley and Blair, 1983, p276-277). 
The saturation bombing in support of the breakout in St. Lô was to be the most 
novel and aggressive use of air power to date in the war.  While briefing the AAF top 
brass, General Bradley and Quesada attempted to finalize the plan for Cobra.  Bradley 
asked for a force of 1,500 bombers for the attack, General Leigh-Mallory promised him 
2,246 airplanes (Hansen, 1944).  The one element of the plan that was not settled (sources 
contradict each other on this point) was the approach path that the bombers would use.  
Bradley asked (and assumed he got it) that the planes would proceed parallel to the St. 
Lô-Périers road (Bradley and Blair, 1983, p 276).  The AAF generals never agreed to this 
approach path, claiming that it exposed their airplanes and crews to unacceptable flak 
(Hughes, 1995, p 200). They wanted to approach the rectangle perpendicular to the St. 
Lô-Périers road, thus giving their bombers more room and protection.  Perhaps Bradley 
overlooked the miss-coordination of approach paths because he was overly encouraged 
by the increase in bombers.  Whatever the reason, this misunderstanding would prove 
disastrous. 
After several days of delay due to rain and poor runway conditions, General 
Leigh-Mallory gave the order.  Thousands of bombers and fighters took of from England 
and struggled to form into the myriad formations required for the attack.  Because of 
weather concerns (cloudiness over England and France) and second-guessing, Leigh-
Mallory recalled the aircraft, cancelled the recall and then recalled them again.  The result 
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was all but a few of the heavy bombers returned and half of the fighters (Hughes, 1995, p 
206).  In St. Lô, the American troops, who previously withdrew to safe positions, got the 
cancellation order and returned to the front lines; they were unaware of the approaching 
armada. (Bradley and Blair, 1983, p 279) 
As the bombers appeared in France, it was only a matter of minutes before the 
devastation began.  The uninformed bombers started their drops.  While most of the 
bombers delivered their ordnance in the strike zone, some of them did not.  Some were as 
far as 2000 yards off (Craven and Cate, 1948, p 233).  The unwarned American front line 
troops were scattered by the ensuing chaos.  There were 156 American casualties, 25 of 
those were killed.  Bradley and Quesada were shocked; they were surprised to see the 
bombers but even more astounded that the bombers made their approach perpendicular to 
the St. Lô-Périers road.  When asked about the approach, Leigh-Mallory said that the 
Eighth Air Force had made no mistake.  They claimed the perpendicular approach was 
the only way to get all the bombers through in Bradley’s timeframe.  Recounting the 
events later, Bradley stated,  
To my astonishment, the Air Force brass simply lied, claiming they had 
never agreed to bomb parallel to the road.  Not only that, they put me over 
an impossible barrel.  They would not mount a second attack except 
perpendicularly to the to the road.  Fearing the Germans were onto us, I 
had no choice but to accept what the airmen offered and we reset the 
jump-off for the following day, July 25 (Bradley and Blair, 1983, p 279-
80).  
On the 25th of July, the bombers returned, again on a perpendicular approach, and 
once more the bombs fell short.  The first of the heavy bomber waves hit well within the 
strike zone.  The last wave, whose target area was obscured by dust and smoke, dropped 
its bomb load on American positions.  All in all, 111 Americans were killed and another 
490 wounded on the second day of bombing (Hughes, 1995, p 215).  The Germans fared 
far worse.  No fewer than 1,000 men died, communications were completely disrupted, 
scant few tanks and tank destroyers survived and the troops who were not dead or 
wounded were in shock.  Very little resistance was offered to the advancing American 
troops (Bradley and Blair, 1983, pp 280-81). 
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Ironically, one of the Americans killed by AAF bombs was General Leslie 
McNair, Commander of the American Ground Forces (Patton, 1947, p 95).  The air-
ground team obviously needed more refinement.  One step they took was thorough 
procedural and organizational change. 
 
C. ORGANIZATION 
During the breakout of Normandy, the Ninth Air Force, under General Hoyt 
Vandenberg, consisted of three TACs: IX, XIX, and XXIX.  The Ninth Air Force’s equal 
on the AGF side was the 12th Army group under General Omar Bradley.  The TACs 
maintained partnerships with their associated field armies: the 1st, 3rd, and 9th.  Each TAC 
had anywhere from four to eight fighter-bomber groups and one reconnaissance group 
attached to it (Lester, 1997, p 11).  The number of fighter-bomber groups varied due to 
the fluid nature of the Ninth Air Force organizational concept.  The fighter-bomber 
groups could be moved as needed.   
The TAC was responsible for coordinating with its associated army component 
for all fighter-bomber reconnaissance operations.  The TACs were granted a great deal of 
autonomous authority to conduct operations in conjunction with their army counterparts, 
but the Ninth Air Force always retained the ability to reapportion forces where they were 
needed.  The flexibility inherent in this system allowed the Ninth Air Force to change its 
structure on an ad hoc basis to fit the operational requirements.  This approach to military 
organization was unique.  The flat nature of the organizational structure allowed a great 
deal of lateral control and communication within the Ninth Air Force.  Also, the thorough 
integration of liaison officers at all levels of the 12th Army Group and Ninth Air Force 
command structure helped enabled the Ninth Air Force to structure itself in such an 
unusual way.  This structure helped create a very effective air-ground team (Kohn and 
Harahan, 1984, p 8-9). 
Maj. Gen. Elwood Quesada, Commander of IX Tactical Air Command (TAC), 
recognized the need for liaison officers at all levels of the AAF and AGF organization.  
Quesada did this by collocating his headquarters with General Bradley’s.  He insured that 
adequate numbers of liaison offers were assigned at every command level to facilitate 
information flows and properly integrate air power into the ground battle plans.  Quesada, 
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like the other TAC commanders, operated a joint operations center (JOC) or combined 
operations center (COC) to provide C2.  An experienced combat fighter pilot ran the JOC 
as the combat operations officer.  Usually a senior Army officer, Naval liaison officer, 
and intelligence officers kept track of the current air and ground situation for the JOC 
(Lester, 1997, p 11).  Finally, a tactical air control center (TACC or TCC depending on 
the referenced source) carried out the directives of the JOC and was responsible for all 
offensive and defensive missions within its geographic area.  The maximum range of the 
TACC’s radar coverage defined this area (Clark, 1944, p 258 and Kohn and Harahan, 
1984, p 105).  The forward director post (FDP) also had radar that could extend the 
TACC’s range of control.  The following diagram (Figure 6.) illustrates the overall 
organizational structure in action: 
 
Figure 6.   Tactical Air Command Immediate Support System, Summer-Fall 1944.  (From: 
Hallion, 1989, p 198) 
 
The following list will explain the air-ground CAS control process via the 
numbered sequence in Figure 6.: 
1.  Division Air-Ground Coordination Party (AGCP), staffed by Tactical 
Air Party Officer (TAPO) and Division G-3 (Air), send direct support 
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request to Army G-3 at COC, also informing Corps G-3 (Air) so Corps 
AGCP can monitor or intervene as necessary. 
2.  Corps AGCP monitors communications net. 
3.  COC, consisting of Army G-2 and G-3 together with TAC’s A-2 and 
A-3 (termed combat operations), consults with Army HQ ad TAC HQ on 
request; then G-3 and A-3 each approve it. 
4.  A-3 at Combat Ops relays support request and recommended course of 
action to TCC, also termed fighter control center. 
5.  Forward Director Post (FDP), in constant communication with TCC, 
provides continuous updates on location of friendly and enemy air units 
using microwave early warning (MEW) radar tracking. 
6.  TCC relays strike request to airborne on-call fighter-bombers. 
7.  FDP, using SCR-584 radar, furnishes precise guidance and navigation 
information to en-route strike flight. 
8.  Division AGCP prepares for incoming strike flight by artillery fire to 
mark targets with colored smoke and to suppress enemy air defenses; AGP 
will maintain communication with strike flight during attack (Hallion, 
1989, p 198).  
One reason that CAS became successful in the ETO was due to the afore-
mentioned organizational structure.  It afforded on-the-spot interchange and coordination 
of air and ground information.  The co-location of ground and air commanders and their 
staffs was essential for joint planning to be conducted and decisions made in near real-
time.  The air and ground headquarters maintained this close physical proximity from the 
TAC-army level upward for the remainder of the war.  It was that flexible and responsive 
organizational structure that improved CAS after the breakout of Normandy.  In essence, 
the air and ground elements were networked together in a non-traditional way. 
   
D. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications improvements had the greatest impact on CAS innovation.  
Before radios became standardized equipment between the AAF and AGF, AGF units 
used fluorescent panels and colored smoke to mark the front lines for CAS aircraft.  The 
Germans first used colored panels and smoke in 1939 when its dive-bombers had 
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difficulty distinguishing who was who on the ground.  The rapidly moving Panzer units 
made the traditional “front line” obsolete (Murray, 1990, p 85).     This practice was used 
a great deal by the Americans later on in the war.  They did this out of fear of being 
mistaken for enemy units and subjecting themselves to friendly fire.  However, the 
markers sometimes gave away their positions.  The widespread use of these signaling 
methods occasionally confused the pilots and they could not distinguish the front lines of 
battle. 
The AGF soon developed new ways of marking the enemy and new procedures to 
avoid friendly fire.  One way the AGF marked the enemy was to coordinate the 
deployment of smoke shells with approaching CAS aircraft.  When the aircraft came into 
visual range, artillery units would fire smoke shells onto the enemy’s position (Hallion, 
1989, p 198).  This method enjoyed some success (to be discussed in a following 
section), but it required the presence of artillery.  Also, when the artillery would fire the 
smoke shells, it would give away its own position, thus eliminating surprise.  There was a 
better way to coordinate CAS.  That was through the use of the radio. 
Initially, HF radios were used on AAF aircraft.  However, they were not 
compatible with AGF VHF systems.  As previously mentioned, the Army developed 
various visual signaling systems and procedures to aid pilots in target location and 
avoidance of friendly forces.  Despite great improvements in signaling and spacing of 
forces clear of bombing zones, friendly fire casualties persisted.  It was not until the 
introduction of VHF radios in the aircraft that real progress in CAS occurred.  
Introduction of VHF radios in CAS aircraft allowed ground units to talk directly with 
their supporting aircraft, greatly improving their accuracy while all but eliminating 
friendly fire casualties.  The capabilities gained from the introduction of the VHF radios 
in the air were enhanced even more by the introduction of skilled controllers on the 
ground.  The introduction of this new technology helped to produce a new concept of 
operations (Hallion, 1989, p 200). 
Another area where communications improvements were made was in the use of 
radar.  The Ninth Air Force used Microwave Early Warning Stations (MEWS) and SCR-
584 control radars at forward director posts to guide planes into close proximity of 
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friendly troops engaged with the enemy (Crane, 1993, p 70).  Line-of-sight beaconing 
systems such as SHORAN were used as well as GEE, a beaconing system that used 
triangulation to help the pilots locate their position (Crane, 1993, p 74).  These systems 
were a great tool for the tactical air force, especially in winter months when visibility was 
poor due to weather.  Because of these advances, as well as advances in tactics, the Ninth 
Air Force operated in support of the advancing armies from 1 October 1944 to 9 May 
1945 without a break.  CAS accuracy increased and AGF losses due to friendly fire were 
greatly reduced (Reed, 1984, p 34).  General Patton, who was a big proponent of CAS, 
commenting on the use of radar said: 
A very fine feat of air co-operation occurred on the twenty-fourth.  Five 
tanks of the 4th Armored were being attacked by some twenty-five German 
tanks, and the only thing we could send to their help was air.  The weather 
was unflyable according to all standards, but General Weyland ordered 
two squadrons to attack.  This they did, being vectored in by radar at a 
height of not over fifteen feet from the ground.  Having located the enemy, 
they skip-bombed and also strafed him.  While this fighting was going on, 
the pilots had no idea that they could ever land and yet carried out their 
job magnificently (Patton, 1947, p136-37).        
 
E. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS (FAC) 
“One look is worth one hundred reports.”  General George S. Patton, Jr. 
quoting a Japanese proverb (Patton, 1947, p 97). 
Before discussing the role of the FAC during the breakout of Normandy, it is 
important to point out some of the early uses of this concept in WWII.  There were two 
systems of forward air control that the AAF tested during the Italian campaign: Horsefly 
and Rover Joe.  Horsefly consisted of an L-5 observation plane flown by an artillery-
spotting pilot.  The pilot would direct fighter-bombers to targets of interest when artillery 
was not available to hit those targets.  This system evolved as the war progressed.  By 
June 1944, the L-5 was equipped with the SCR-522 radio.  A strike pilot, accompanied 
by an infantry officer to help differentiate between friendly and enemy troops, now flew 
the L-5.  The TACs used the L-5 in this capacity until the end of the war (Hallion, 1989, 
p 181-82). 
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Another FAC experiment that took place in Italy, thus laying the foundation for 
FAC development in the breakout of Normandy, was called Rover Joe.  Rover Joe 
consisted of an experienced fighter-bomber pilot and a radio.  The Rover would position 
himself in a location where he could see the whole battlefield. From this position he 
would call in air strikes on enemy locations.  The CAS aircraft would consist of flights of 
four aircraft and were assigned to the Rover every 30 minutes.  Rover Joe could 
effectively describe targets to the pilots and warn them of enemy defenses (HQ MAAF, 
1945, Tab D).  Speaking about the effectiveness of Rover Joe, Gen. Mark Clark noted, 
“Frequently, Rover Joe will put bombs on targets within 1,000 yards of our troops, and 
not once have any of our men been hurt” (Clark, 1944).  The Ninth Air Force developed 
its system of forward air control from the Rover Joe concept, capitalizing on ever-
improving communications technology. 
While the addition of VHF communications in CAS aircraft was an incremental 
technological change, it transformed the CAS mission (Jacobs, 1990, p 263).  Most 
ground units had a least one FAC to enhance CAS effectiveness.  Since the FAC was 
capable of speaking directly with the CAS pilots (or via the TCC), Gen. Quesada 
logically concluded that the FAC ought to be a knowledgeable AAF officer (Jacobs, 
1990, p 271).  He reasoned that if his men and airplanes were going to get in close on the 
battlefield, he wanted someone who could speak the aviator’s lingo directing them in.  In 
effect, Quesada decentralized the IX TAC target assignment function.  This innovation 
and level of understanding that Gen. Quesada applied to the information system between 
the pilot and FAC was extraordinary.   
Using this logic, General Quesada developed the concept of armored column 
cover (ACC) (Hallion, 1989, p 199).  The creation of the ACC concept grew out of a deal 
that Quesada made with Gen. Omar Bradley before the St. Lô breakout attempt.  Before 
this deal was made, Bradley was very skeptical of the AAF’s trustworthiness (as previous 
quotes point out).  Despite his attitude about the AAF, Bradley and Quesada had a very 
good personal and working relationship (Hallion, 1989, p199).  Sensing Bradley’s 
misgivings about committing to his army to the St. Lô breakout, Quesada offered to place 
a FAC and radio with his armor units.  By guaranteeing air support to Bradley’s army in 
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this way, Quesada was setting the stage for air-ground cooperation for the remainder of 
the war in the ETO. 
Quesada’s ACC concept, in practice, outfitted the lead M4 Sherman tank in each 
armored column with an SCR-522 VHF radio and one FAC.  The tank commander used 
an SCR-528 VHF radio to communicate with the other tankers in the column (Hallion, 
1989, p 200).  The ACC received continuous air cover, protecting it from enemy fighters 
and ground fire, while the FAC could direct CAS to specific targets in front of the 
formation.  The column cover aircraft (column cover flight) usually consisted of four P-
47’s.  The P-47 flights were relieved every 30 minutes while the armored column 
operated.  The P-47’s not only sought out targets on the ground, they also performed the 
role of air defense against attacking Luftwaffe aircraft.  The effectiveness of ACC and 
FAC was so great that it went unchanged until the end of the war in the ETO. 
Recounting an instance of air-ground cooperation in the form of ACC, General 
Patton said, 
About an hour before sundown we received a report that an armored 
column was fifteen kilometers southwest of Rennes, moving in rapidly.  I 
asked General Weyland, commanding the XIX Tactical Air Command, to 
send some fighter-bombers to stop it.  The bombers were unable to find 
the column, because it actually was the 4th Armored Division moving in 
from the northeast.  However, the planes did some very effective work 
knocking out enemy resistance ahead of the 4th Armored Division and this 
was the precursor of many other such jobs.  It was love at first sight 
between the XIX Tactical Air Command and the Third Army (Patton, 
1947, p 99). 
General Patton was a true believer in air-ground cooperation.  He believed that the 
team made up of armor and fighter-bombers was almost unbeatable.  He theorized that 
fast moving armor prevented enemy units from moving off the road and thus deploying.  
If the enemy stayed on the road than it was easy prey for the fighter-bombers.  He went 
on to say that two things were required to make the armor and fighter-bomber team 
effective.  The first thing was intimate friendship and confidence between the air and 
armor.  This friendship and confidence was reinforced by the FAC’s co-location with the 
tank commander and his ability to communicate with the CAS pilots overhead.  The 
second requirement that Patton discussed was incessant and apparently ruthless driving 
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on the part of the ground commander.  Patton said, “A pint of sweat saves a gallon of 
blood.”  Patton’s affinity for CAS is reflected in the following statement, 
Just east of Le Mans was one of the best examples of armor and air co-
operation I have ever seen.  For about two miles the road was full of 
enemy transport and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable calling 
card of a P-47 fighter-bomber – namely, a group of fifty-caliber holes in 
the concrete.  Whenever armor and air can work together in this way, the 
results are sure to be excellent (Patton, 1947, p108). 
A committee composed completely of ground officers (the Air Effects Committee 
of the 12th Army Group) submitted a report concerning ACC operations, the report stated: 
Armor column cover…was of particular value in protecting the unit from 
enemy air attack and in running interference for the spearhead of the 
column by destroying or neutralizing ground opposition that might slow it 
down or stop it… 
The report went on to say, 
The decision of the Ninth Air Force to give high priority to armored 
column cover in a fast-moving or fluid situation from the breakout in 
Normandy to the final drive across Central Europe made a successful 
contribution to the success of the ground units in breaking through and 
encircling the various elements of the German armies…[after addressing 
immediate support needs] the flight leader patrolled ahead of the armored 
column, as deep as thirty miles along its axis of advance, in an intensive 
search for enemy vehicles, troops or artillery.  This effort permitted our 
armor far greater freedom of action than would have been otherwise 
possible (Bradley and Air Effects Committee, 1946, p41-42).   
It was clear that the ground commanders saw the incredible utility of CAS in the 
ETO.  The addition of the FAC, especially in the ACC role, was an extremely effective 
innovation in CAS tactics.  It is interesting to consider the pilots’ point of view.  The next 
section will elaborate on what the pilot’s thought about CAS and FACs in the ETO.  
 
F. FAC: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS FROM AMERICAN CAS PILOTS 
Veteran fighter-bomber pilots provided the information about CAS, FAC and 
their communication systems in the following section from WWII.  The information was 
obtained through interviews conducted on electronic mail and through telephone 
conversations.  Although the interviews were informal, the accounts of the interviewees 
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were very enlightening and highly relevant to this chapter.  I have selected three former 
fighter-bomber pilots and some of their insights for this section. 
1. Robert V. Brulle 
Robert Brulle served with the 390th Squadron in the 366th Fighter Group, flying P-
47 Thunderbolts in a CAS role.  He completed 70 combat missions.  During this time, he 
was responsible for destroying a very large amount of German war materiél.  While 
flying most missions in a CAS role, Brulle had one encounter with German aircraft.  On 1 
January 1945 he shot down a FW-190.  Brulle also conducted armed reconnaissance 
missions while serving in WWII. 
  In addition to Brulle’s actions as a fighter-bomber pilot, he spent two weeks as a 
FAC riding in an ACC tank.  Many fighter-bomber pilots were rotated into two-week 
long FAC duties.  In Brulle’s words,” I spent two weeks in a tank as a Forward Air 
Controller, which I did not like at all!  We [fighter-bombers in general] dive bombed and 
strafed very close to our own troops several times.  I do not think we ever bombed them 
but the ground forces shot at us many times.”  During their two-week duty as an ACC 
FAC, many of the fighter-bombers like Brulle saw how effective CAS was from armor’s 
perspective.  Brulle did say that the pilots thought the “FACs were great and led them 
right to the target.”  It is interesting that Brulle expressed distaste for being a FAC; that 
comment suggests that the fighter- bombers provided extremely close support to the 
ground forces.  One thing that Brulle remembered about signaling with colored panels, 
“The panels worked great but sometimes the Germans displayed captured panels and 
confused us.  Brulle, like the other fighter-bomber pilots preferred the radios and ACC 
system (Brulle, 10 March 2002). 
Robert Brulle also commented on the use of radar.  He said that they ran “Pickle 
Barrel” missions, their code name for radar directed attacks, quite often.  He recalled that 
they did not have a lot of confidence in the radar system.  This was his belief until he was 
on a mission and saw a hole open up in the cloud layer and saw his bombs hit the target.  
He did say that for most missions they did not use radar guidance directly; the type of 
CAS missions he performed did not require radar because he could see his targets up 
close (Brulle, 11 March 2002). 
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Robert V. Brulle continues to be active in the aviation field.  He just finished a 
book on this subject entitled, Angles Zero: P-47 Close Air Support in Europe.  He is 
currently finishing a second book about his 50-year adventure in the aviation industry; in 
it, he will address young engineer’s reliance on computers and technology.  He states 
that, “They feel it [technology] is a panacea, but in reality it is only as good as the data 
put in by a human hand.  I think we may be placing too much emphasis on technology 
and not enough on people.”  It may be beneficial for the current generation to heed the 
words of this wise Thunderbolt pilot (Brulle, 11 March 2002). 
2. Vernon Truemper 
Vernon Truemper is the current president of the 367th Fighter Group Association.  
Truemper started out flying the P-38 Lightning and then his unit changed over to the P-
47.  He remembers doing most of his support for Patton’s Third army and for the 4th 
Armored Division.  He recounted doing ACC missions similar to those of Robert Brulle.  
He also noted that he clearly remembered the yellow or cerise panels that the American 
ground troops covered their armor with.  He said that the panels were a very good 
signaling method to the pilots above.  On the issue of FACs Truemper said, “We became 
very friendly with the FACs, and relied on them very much.  I can never recall being 
directed by radar.  Since we did not use it a lot we never knew enough to have a high 
level of confidence in it.  The panels worked well for us although we did rely on voice 
communication with the FAC in conjunction with the panels” (Truemper, 12 March 
2002). 
Vernon Truemper provided a digital image of a Dynamite Gang (nickname of his 
squadron) “crib sheet” or “mission slip” that he and the other fighter-bomber pilots used 
on every mission.  During the mission briefing, the Intelligence Officer (IO) would 





Figure 7.    Vernon Truemper’s Crib Sheet.  (From: Truemper, 12 March 2002) 
 
The following will describe the contents of the crib sheet depicted in figure 7:   
S/E: 15:20 = START ENGINESAT 3:20 PM 
T/O: 1530 = TAKE OFF AT 3:30 PM 
S/C: 15:40 = START COURSE AT 3:40 PM 
The sheet instructed the pilots to reach altitude at a distance of 45 
miles with a compass course of 62 degrees.  (A base altitude was given 
and they would refer to their altitude as angles or devils whether above or 
below the base altitude.  The sheet shows an estimated time of arrival 
(ETA) of 1554.  At 1554 proceed to INGELHEIM, a distance of 51 miles 
with a compass heading of 63 degrees, ETA of 1606.  Next, proceed to 





Next, remain in the area for 30 minutes.  The 3rd Army contact is 
“Briefguide” on channel B.  Their armor and trucks will display yellow 
panels singly.  Targets will be received from them. 
The CAS aircraft would return to base, a distance of 217 miles on 
course heading 249 degrees with an ETA of 1805.  Home base contact was 
“Dynamite” on channel A.  If something should necessitate a recall, the 
fighter recall code was “Night and Day.” 
Dekko identified their squadron (393rd fighter squadron in this 
case).  The numbers identified the flight and the letters identified the 
person when talking to Dynamite or Briefguide (Truemper, 12 March 
2002). 
3. Jack T. Curtis 
Jack Curtis also flew P-47s in the 367th, The Dynamite Gang, along side Vernon 
Truemper.  Curtis regarded the P-47 as “an excellent ship for close support.”  He says 
that a lot of the pilots in his group were assigned FAC duties with the armor and infantry.  
He said that at first (immediately after the landings at Normandy) there were a lot of 
problems coordinating with the ground troops and that there were several cases of 
friendly fire casualties.  He expressly remembered the friendly fire casualties that 
occurred at the breakout of St. Lô.  Curtis also mentioned that General Pete Quesada was 
the “kingpin” on getting the coordination right. 
Curtis had an interesting memory about conducting an airborne FAC mission that 
was similar to the Horsefly missions in Italy.  It was shortly after his squadron shifted 
from flying the P-38 to the P-47 in February 1945.  He was put in contact (by a ground 
controller) with an L-5 artillery forward observer.  Because of light flak, the L-5 could 
not get in close enough to perform his mission.  So, the L-5 observer asked Curtis to 
adjust the Corps’ artillery in his stead.  The L-5 observer gave Curtis the coordinates of 
the target and Curtis asked the Corps artillery for one round of white smoke for reference.  
Curtis observed the white smoke and made two adjustments for the artillery and asked for 
“Fire for Effect!”  Curtis said that he was “flabbergasted by the destruction that those big 
guns had on the German 88 positions.” 
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Curtis also remembered doing some blind bombing missions.  Ground controllers 
led these missions using bombsights that traveled over charts (following the CAS 
aircrafts’ movements) of the area to be bombed.  Curtis recalls that these missions were 
not very successful and they did not like them.  Again, this was due to lack of confidence 
in radar. 
Jack Curtis also provided a copy of a mission slip; it is a bit clearer and a little 
different than Truemper’s in Figure 7.  At the bottom of the slip is RIPSAW.  That was 
the name of the radar controller who was located near the bomb line.  He was on VHF 
channel C.  The letters at the top indicated that the planes were lettered M, N, L and WB.  
M was the flight leader, N was his wingman (Curtis’s plane), L was the element leader 
and WB was his wingman.  RED was the name of their flight.  INDEX ABLES were 
challenges in case a transmission needed verification that it was not a German trying to 
lead them astray.  They would challenge a transmission by saying: INDEX ABLE 45 and 
the reply would have to be ZXW spoken phonetically.  The INDEX ABLES were 
changed daily.  These are displayed as figure 8 below: 
 
Figure 8.   Jack T. Curtis’ Mission Slip.  (From: Curtis, 9 March 2002) 
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On this particular mission, the 12 American aircraft (all P-38s) were jumped over 
Trier by FW-190s.  RIPSAW, the ground controller, warned them that the bogies were 
approaching, giving them time to prepare to fight.  Curtis recalls that things got very busy 
for the next 20 minutes.  Unfortunately, they lost one pilot, KIA, and another was shot 
down and spent the rest of the war as a POW.  The American shot down six FW-190s 
that day.  Also of note, this took place during the Battle of the Bulge.  During the first 
week of this battle, the effectiveness of CAS was limited due to weather.  However, when 
the skies cleared, CAS scored heavily against the Germans (Arquilla, 2001).  
Curtis also recalls that the radio communications were usually ok.  Sometimes 
they had troubles, especially when the Germans were jamming the signals.  The 367th 
was named the Dynamite Gang because their communications and direction finders had 
the call sign Dynamite.  (Curtis, 9 March 2002)   
                                                                                      
G. AIRCRAFT   
The P-47 was the main aircraft used for the CAS mission.  As previously 
mentioned the P-38 was flown in a CAS role but the P-47 was much more capable.  
Normally, a squadron of twelve aircraft was assigned the CAS role.  Eight of the twelve 
P-47’s were armed with two 500-pound bombs.  The four remaining P-47’s, armed for 
strafing, provided protection from German fighters and ground fire.  When all 500-pound 
bombs were expended, the aircraft would strafe enemy positions with its eight-.50-caliber 
machineguns or conduct reconnaissance behind enemy lines. 
The P-47s provided very effective ground support for the advancing allied forces 
as they drove deeper and deeper through France and on into the heart of Germany.  The 
Thunderbolt’s heavy machineguns and bomb-loads were extremely effective at 
eliminating enemy forces standing in the way of the allied advance.  All of the veteran 
fighter-bomber pilots interviewed for this chapter preferred the P-47 to the P-38.  One of 
the reasons the P-47 was superior to the P-38 (as well as the other friendly and enemy 
planes in the ETO) was its air-cooled engine.  Most airplanes of that time had water-
cooled engines which were vulnerable to flak and small arms fire.  The P-47 could take 
substantial battle damage and still remain airborne (Hallion, 1989, p 202).  The P-47 and 
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P-38 are pictured in Figure 9.  The P-47 pictured is the variant that still had the framed 
canopy.  Newer versions used a bubble canopy that gave much better visibility: 
 
Figure 9.   P-47 Thunderbolt (Left) and the P-38 Lightning (Right).  (From: Wagner, 1982) 
 
 
H. GERMAN REACTION TO AMERICAN AIR POWER 
As Germans were being driven back into Germany, there was no doubt that 
American close air support was taking its toll on Germany’s army.  In a letter to his wife, 
Field Marshall Rommel wrote, ”The enemy’s air superiority has a very grave effect on 
our movements.  There’s simply no answer to it” (Ruge, 1979, p 181).  It is very 
interesting that Rommel concluded, after witnessing American CAS tactics, that, “the 
tactical Luftwaffe has to be an organic part of the army, otherwise one cannot operate.”  
This is interesting because it shows that the Germans, at least Rommel, did not 
understand how the AAF evolved.  He did not understand that the reason the AAF were 
so effective was because they were no longer organic to the ground forces. 
Ironically, CAS ended Rommel’s participation in the war.  As Rommel returned 
from a trip visiting an SS armor unit, his car was strafed.  His driver was killed and the 
car went off the side of the road.  Rommel sustained a head injury after being thrown 
from the car.  He returned to Germany to recuperate.  A short time thereafter he took his 
own life after being implicated in Hitler’s assassination attempt (Hallion, 1989, p206). 
As a diversion for the impending American breakout from St. Lô, General 
Montgomery’s Operation Goodwood began with a huge air armada attack on German 
positions.  It started at dawn and consisted of over 2100 aircraft.  The attack went on for 
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four hours and had devastating effects on German troops and equipment.  The air prelude 
to Montgomery’s ground offensive was decisive (Carell, 1963, pp 224-225). 
General Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, suffered through a 
similar air strike during the St. Lô breakout.  More than 2000 bombers and over 400 
fighter-bombers attacked his positions.    The attack turned the Panzer Lehr and 13th and 
15th Parachute Regiments into a “corridor of death four miles wide and two miles deep” 
(Carell, 1963, p 232).  After the initial air attack, one of Bayerlein’s lieutenants gave the 
following reconnoiter report to him: “I did not find a single strongpoint that was intact.  
The main fighting line has vanished.  Where it used to be is now a zone of death” (Carell, 
1963, p 234). 
Later that same day, General Bayerlein was given an order from Field-Marshal 
von Kluge, Commander in Chief West, that ordering him to hold St. Lô at all costs.  The 
order was verbally delivered by one of von Kluge’s general staff officers.  Bayerlein was 
angered by the order and ferociously retorted to the staff officer: 
Out in front everyone is holding out, Herr Oberstleutnant [lieutenant-
colonel, staff officer].  Every one.  My grenadiers and my engineers and 
my tank crews – they’re holding their ground.  Not a single man is leaving 
his post.  Not one!  They’re lying in their foxholes mute and silent, for 
they are dead.  Dead.  Do you understand? (Carell, 1963, p235) 
After the breakout from Normandy, Allied fighter-bombers made it very difficult 
for the German army to move during daylight hours.  One incident that really 
demonstrates this occurred when General Meindl, Commander of the 2nd Parachute 
Corps, was driving back to his headquarters.  Over the course of the nine-mile drive, he 
was chased out of his vehicle by fighter-bombers 30 times.  The once 30 minute trip took 
over four hours to complete.  He was lucky to make it back alive and uninjured (Carell, 
1963, p 237). 
The next day, General Meindl, like Bayerlein, was visited by one of von Kluge’s 
staff officers (this time it was von Kluge’s son).  The reason for the visit was to order 
Meindl to conduct a daytime tank attack against the advancing Americans.  Having just 
been harassed by fighter-bombers the day before, Meindl shouted at von Kluge’s son: 
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If your father knew what it means to operate against an enemy with a 
downright fabulous command of the air, then he would know that our only 
chance of doing anything useful at all is by attacking at night.  
Tomorrow’s tank attack is going to be a failure, because it is scheduled on 
too broad a front and because it isn’t going to start until dawn, which 
means it will take place in daylight.  Those tanks are destined to be 
smashed.  And all that’s left for the grenadiers to do is to lie down and 
sacrifice their lives.  It’s heartbreaking to stand by and watch (Carell, 
1963, p 238)! 
General Meindl was correct.  The Americans were far too powerful in the air and 
the ground.  The Germans did start moving their units by night to avoid the fighter-
bombers, but it only delayed their eventual destruction.  Any German activity conducted 
during the daytime was done under the hopes of bad weather – bad weather was one of 
the only things that covered them from the eyes and ordnance of the fighter-bombers.      
 
I. CONCLUSION          
 Innovation to the CAS mission in the ETO was slow in coming.  It did not really 
take place until the 1943-1944 time frame.  Existing technologies of the period were used 
while new concepts of operations were slowly incorporated.  Some incremental changes 
in technology occurred (addition of the VHF radio into aircraft and use of radar) but did 
not cause the overall change in operational philosophy.  The VHF radio did enhance the 
overall effectiveness of CAS but the search for new CONOPS was already in progress.  
The introduction of the FAC and ACC concept, combined with radar and radio 
technological improvements created a revolution in CAS tactics and doctrine.  The 
technology combined with the human operators resulted in a system that helped the 
Allies win the war in the ETO.   
Fortunately, the AAF and AGF commanders in the ETO had the ability to step 
above their individual services’ cultural biases and hammer out a new concept of 
operations in CAS.  It is also worth noting that innovation can occur from the bottom up 
in an organization even when doctrine would seem to prevent this from happening.  It 
may even be interesting to evaluate if top down innovation efforts are even fruitful, as 
with the current RMA.  Finally, I would like to point out the clear effectiveness that the 
ACC and FAC (a small and mobile unit), combined with a relatively reliable information 
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system (the VHF radio and radar), had on the battlefield in CAS.  It is interesting that a 
small unit of maneuver, combined with an effective information system, manned by 
human beings who could employ it, was the locus of a great innovation in military tactics 
and doctrine back in WWII. 
The next chapter of this thesis will examine current manifestations of CAS.  
Operations in Afghanistan as well as recent training operations with CAS and FAC will 
be included in this examination.  Similarities and differences between current CAS/FAC 









V. CURRENT OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its 
own peculiar preconceptions… It follows that the events of every age 
must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities (Clausewitz, 1984, p 
593). 
By the end of WWII, the concept of CAS was highly developed.  The role of the 
FAC, especially his use in ACC, was instrumental in making CAS effective.  
Technological advances in radar and communications were combined with a unique and 
flexible command and control organization resulting in a very effective information 
system.  This information system allowed the CAS pilots to quickly locate and accurately 
attack enemy targets within close proximity of the advancing allied forces. 
Today, CAS still remains an important battlefield capability.  However, 
technology has somewhat altered its execution.  In the past, WWII CAS pilots engaged 
their targets at extremely close range in order to increase the accuracy of their weapons.  
Now, improvements in weapons guidance and sensor capabilities have allowed the 
shooter to release his weapons at greater and greater distances from the target, effectively 
decoupling range and accuracy.  These technologically enhanced weapons are labeled 
precision guided munitions or  “smart weapons.” 
  The following sections will examine my trip to Nellis AFB to observe Exercise 
Red Flag 01-02; CAS, FACs, PGMs, and their use in the ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan.  In addition, a brief look at recent cases of friendly fire accidents involving 
CAS and a discussion of Red Flag 01-02 will be included.     
 
B. EXERCISE RED FLAG 01-02 
In January 2002 I had the opportunity to observe exercise Red Flag 01-02.  
Although this exercise was primarily designed to evaluate the joint services’ ability to 
conduct air supremacy operations, a portion of the exercise was devoted to CAS, FAC 
utilization, and working with the underlying information system.  My role in this exercise 
was strictly as an observer. 
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During the first few days of the exercise, I shadowed a USMC Force 
Reconnaissance unit in the field.  Their mission was to observe enemy convoys passing 
through the area and make “9-Line” (CAS) reports to F-117 aircraft, airborne C3 aircraft 
(ABCCC), or the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC).  This exercise was designed 
to evaluate the feasibility, connectivity and effectiveness of using a USMC SOF unit in 
conjunction with the F-117.  Unfortunately, the exercise was non-productive. 
One of the problems that persisted throughout the exercise was an inability to 
communicate using the designated communications gear.  Communications were only 
achieved (for administrative purposes) via a range control radio (not part of exercise) and 
commercial cellular telephone.  Needless to say, communications training was minimal.  
The F-117 pilot (commanding officer of the squadron) informed me that he over-flew our 
position several times and picked us up on his thermal imager (outside air temperature 
was 10 degrees Fahrenheit at night) but was unable to reach us on any communications 
frequency (Interview, 24 January 2002). 
Another problem encountered was a lack of understanding on the part of the 
ABCCC and CAOC that the force reconnaissance team was not a highly mobile unit.  
The force reconnaissance team was inserted via truck and conducted a patrol (several 
miles on foot) to the designated observation point.  At one point in the exercise the 
ABCCC, with CAOC concurrence, requested the force reconnaissance team relocate to 
an observation point 12 kilometers away within 15 minutes.  This was an unachievable 
objective.  Due to communications problems previously discussed, the force 
reconnaissance team could not communicate its inability to traverse the 12 kilometers 
within 15 minutes on foot.   That event marked the end of my participation in the field.  
I also had the opportunity to inquire about the CAS capability of the F-117.  I 
quickly learned that the F-117 is a very technology dependent aircraft.  By that I mean, it 
is not very flexible in its mission profile.  I was informed that the pilot’s role is simply to 
monitor the aircraft’s systems.  When asked about the Stealth Fighter’s ability to perform 
on-call CAS operations, the pilot stated that it was very difficult to accomplish and very 
unlikely.  Most F-117 missions are pre-planned and have low tolerance for deviation.  
The onboard computer systems function best according to their pre-programmed mission 
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requirements; deviation form those requirements are not optimal.  The pilot did mention 
that there are efforts underway to make the system more flexible and more multi-mission 
capable (Interview, 24 January 2002). 
My overall impression from Red Flag 01-02 is that the joint services need to take 
a closer look at the communications shortfalls that exist.  Without good communications, 
operations will cease to be coordinated and effective.  This is especially true in joint 
operations and asymmetrical warfare. 
   
C. PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS 
The use of PGMs has increased dramatically in the last two decades.  Improved 
intelligence and targeting systems coupled to these weapons has allowed them to become 
more effective while reducing collateral damage effects.  It is estimated that by early 
February 2002, roughly 10,000 of the 18,000 weapons dropped on Afghanistan were of 
the precision-guided variety.  That equates to 56 percent, compared to the 35 percent of 
PGMs dropped in Kosovo and nine percent dropped during Desert Storm (Kind, 2002, p 
1; Owens, 2000, p 114). 
Admiral Bill Owens places PGMs into three distinct categories.  The first is the 
class of PGM that requires the continuous presence of a human being.  These weapons 
are directed, from weapons launch until impact, to their intended targets by a human 
operator.  The tube-launched, optically aimed, wire-guided (TOW) missile and laser-
guided bombs are examples of this type of PGM.  If, for some reason, the operator takes 
his eye off the target, the weapon will likely miss (Owens, 2000, p 143). 
The second class of PGM does not rely on a human being for its guidance, but 
instead uses its own sensor, or smarts, to find its target.  Some of the sensors that these 
PGMs utilize are: acoustic, radar, infrared or a combination of these.  The torpedo, 
Sidewinder and Stinger are examples of these weapons. Unlike the previous class of 
PGMs, these do not require the constant attention of a human being.  (Owens, 2000, p 
144) 
The third type of PGM, and the one that best fits Admiral Owens’ system of 
systems, is the “fire-and-forget” class.  These weapons are autonomous and get their 
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guidance information from the global positioning system (GPS) or inertial navigation 
systems (INS).  The current version of the Tomahawk and the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM) both get their main guidance data from GPS.  (Owens, 2000, p 144)  
These weapons do not require information from the target nor are they severely affected 
by weather.  These weapons are considered fire-and-forget because they use GPS and are 
not tied to the shooter.  GPS ties these weapons into the system of systems (assuming 
GPS will be a vital part of the system of systems). 
The majority of the PGMs expended in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo were 
1,000-pound laser-guided bombs.  These laser-guided bombs home in on a bright spot of 
reflected laser energy from a laser designator that an aircrew or ground controller holds 
on the intended target.  Laser-guided bombs range in size (500, 1,000, 2,000 and 5,000 
pound penetrator) and function.  These systems are highly accurate, but poor weather can 
make them unusable.  This variety of PGM was the predominant precision weapon used 
during Operation Desert Storm.  The JDAM, an all-weather, GPS-guided weapon, was 
introduced during Allied Force and comes in the 1,000 to 2,000 pound variety. 
            
D. CASES OF FRIENDLY FIRE: FRATRICIDE 
The development of PGMs and their increased use has played a major role in 
decreasing the number of friendly fire incidents.  However, despite the improved 
systems, fratricide persists.  This unfortunate reality has caused some debate the necessity 
of CAS.  History has proven the utility of CAS, so, the occurrence of fratricide is not 
likely to end it.  This is partly due to the fact that each incident of fratricide is evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis.  Some of these cases will be discussed below. 
The first case of fratricide that will be discussed occurred in March 2001.  This 
accident occurred at a bombing range in Kuwait.  A Navy F/A-18 dropped three 500-
pound general-purpose bombs on the observation post located on the range.  Six 
personnel were killed (including the FAC) and four more were seriously injured.  The 
pilot mistook the observation post as the target.  The pilot of the strike aircraft was the 
commanding officer of his squadron, an experienced aviator. 
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As previously mentioned, the three bombs were general-purpose bombs, not 
PGMs.  Despite the fact that these were not PGMs, the pilot had communications with 
the FAC and airborne FAC.  The resulting investigation determined that the pilot dropped 
his ordnance prior to receiving a “cleared hot” report from the FAC.  All personnel 
involved with the exercise were fully qualified, at least on paper.  The investigation also 
blamed lack of CAS training, poor tactics and equipment (Wood, 2001, p 2). 
The accident in Kuwait took place after four similar incidents in the previous 
months.  In one of these incidents, an Air Force F-16 pilot misidentified that observation 
post and fired his rockets at it.  In another accident, a Marine F/A-18 pilot dropped one of 
his 500-pound bombs on the wrong target, nearly killing the ground controllers.  These 
events were documented by the DoD study of close air support at Ft. Irwin.  In October 
2000, the Joint CAS Study reported that in 22 exercises involving 218 CAS missions, 
there were major problems in planning, coordination, training and equipment.  The report 
also said that ground control officers (FACs) “are not adequately trained to plan, prepare 
and execute” CAS. 
In a more recent (and more publicized due to surrounding events) accident 
involving CAS, three servicemen were killed and 20 others were injured when the JDAM 
they called for exploded in their vicinity.  On 5 December 2001, the PGM was released 
from a B-52 providing CAS to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan.  Details 
of the exact cause of the accident are not yet known, but it is speculated that the FAC was 
either too close to the location where the 2,000-pound bomb exploded, he sent incorrect 
coordinates to the B-52 crew, or the B-52 crewman incorrectly entered the target’s 
coordinates. 
Other cases of fratricide or collateral damage (which is considered nearly as bad) 
in Afghanistan are as follows:  8 October 2001, four UN workers killed in Kabul; 13 
October, at least 4 civilians killed when a Navy jet misses its target; 16 October, Red 
Cross warehouse in Kabul hit by bombs; 22 October, AC-130 hits civilians in Chowkor 
Kariz village; 8-10 November, 30-70 civilians killed in raids north of Khandahar, etc…  
There were at least 13 instances of fratricide or unacceptable collateral damage to date in 
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Afghanistan.  How can this happen when such a large percentage of the weapons dropped 
were smart weapons?  Were some of the lessons from the past forgotten or ignored? 
There is almost always a specific cause, mechanical or human, which can be 
identified and corrected, so friendly fire incidents will be reduced incrementally by 
technological improvements, better procedural controls and better training.  Fratricide is 
preventable but it will continue.  This is because, in ADM Stufflebeem’s words,  
These are human-made, human-designed systems, and therefore, they’re 
going to have flaws that are going to either be built in or that are going to 
occur.  We have not perfected a technology that is perfect in its execution.  
However, we have come to expect an extremely high standard with this 
precision that doesn’t really allow for the realities of what happens when it 
doesn’t meet that standard (News Briefing, 5 December 2001). 
After the friendly fire accident that killed the three servicemen, the Marine Corps 
conducted a meeting of its top leadership and subject matter experts to determine if 
standardized procedures existed for the employment of the JDAM PGM.  The meeting 
resulted in a message (DTG 041530ZJAN02) that implemented temporary safety 
procedures for the employment of the JDAM.  The message pointed out a lack of 
proficiency of USMC FACs to derive accurate target coordinates and elevation.  It 
directed commanders to evaluate the efficiency of their FACs in these skills as well as 
their knowledge of JDAM capabilities, limitations and necessity for its use. 
Another option for reducing friendly fire casualties can be achieved as a result of 
the increased accuracy of PGMs.  As targeting improves and accuracy increases, the need 
for 2,000- pound bombs is reduced.  When our forces are close to the enemy and call for 
CAS, a 500-pound PGM can do the job that once required a 2,000-pound bomb.  If the 
500-pound weapon hits exactly where it is required, then our personnel will not be 
exposed to the blast effects and shrapnel created if a 2,000- pound weapon were used.      
 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN 
Attempting to draw out the implications of the war in Afghanistan can be valuable 
on some levels, but can be troublesome on others.  Since combat operations are ongoing, 
any conclusions made at this point ought to be taken with some degree of caution.  In the 
area of CAS use and its effects, Afghanistan appears to be fairly cut and dry.  At the 
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outset of operations, the U.S. conducted strategic bombing missions that were ineffective.  
Later on, CAS missions were initiated with FAC.  The CAS missions were immediately 
decisive.  The limited, yet highly trained (i.e. special operations forces - SOF), American 
and British ground forces are operating in an advisory role to the Northern Alliance 
forces.  Although the initial weeks of combat could not be characterized as efficient in 
terms of CAS, SOF effectively integrated themselves with the Northern Alliance. 
After what limited air defenses the Taliban government possessed were defeated, 
U.S. and coalition force aircraft could operate in a permissive environment.  This enabled 
them to keep collateral damage to a minimum while ensuring accurate targeting.  Once 
this air environment persisted, SOF began to assume the role of FAC.  When that 
occurred, the Taliban and Al Qaida began to lose their hold on power.  The lethality of 
the CAS and FAC coupled with PGM technology had a devastating effect on the 
Taliban’s ability to function.  This is similar to the effect that CAS and the FAC had on 
the Germans in WWII, after the breakout of Normandy. 
While the use of SOF units as FAC assets for coalition aircraft was (and still is) 
quite effective, its value should not be overstated.  As previously mentioned, combat 
operations are not completed.  Also, Afghanistan may not be representative of future 
conflicts.  As such, any lessons learned must be cautionary at best.  However, it may be 
possible that the use of relatively few American and British SOFs in the FAC role in 
addition to the exchange/supply of fairly rudimentary arms to the Northern Alliance may 
constitute a watershed event in how we conduct future operations in asymmetrical 
warfare.  Only time will tell, but is it possible that we have relied too heavily on high 
technology as being the only answer to asymmetrical threats? 
It seems, at least in Afghanistan, that American and British SOFs had to use local 
politics, diplomacy, understanding of the culture and extremely flexible coalition building 
skills to be successful.  It also seems, at least on the surface, that technology played a 
relatively small role in their overall effectiveness.  Another factor that may be unique in 
this situation is the skill of professional soldiering.  Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz, in a recent interview, commented on this.  He read two situation reports from 
an American SOF soldier.  The first is dated 25 October 2001 and reads as follows: 
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I am advising a man on how best to employ light infantry and horse 
cavalry in the attack against Taliban T-55 tanks, mortars, artillery, 
personnel carriers and machine guns – a tactic which I think became 
outdated with the introduction of the Gatling gun.  The Mujahadeen have 
done this every day we have been on the ground.  They have attacked with 
10 rounds AK per man, with PK gunners (snipers) having less than 100 
rounds… little water and less food.  I have observed a PK gunner who 
walked 10-plus miles to get to the fight, who was proud to show me his 
artificial right leg from the knee down… We have witnessed the horse 
cavalry from spur to spur to attack Taliban strong points – the last several 
kilometers under mortar, artillery, and PK fire.  There is little medical care 
if injured, only a donkey ride to the aid station, which is a dirt hut.  I think 
the Mujahadeen are doing very well with what they have.  They have 
killed over 125 Taliban… while losing only eight.  We couldn’t do what 
we are doing without close air support.  Everywhere I go the Mujahadeen 
soldiers and civilians are always telling me they are glad the USA has 
come.  They all speak of their hopes for a better Afghanistan once the 
Taliban are gone.  Better go.  The local commander is finishing his phone 
call with a U.S. Congressman back in the states. 
The images that this SITREP conjure up are incredibly dichotomous.  Mujahadeen horse-
mounted cavalry teamed up with American F/A-18s, F-14s, F-15s and B-52s seems a 
highly unlikely, if not bizarre order of battle.  Notwithstanding, the concept of using B-
52s in a close air support role is a new innovation of an old technology (i.e. using a 
strategic weapon for tactical purposes). 
The second situation report that Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz read is 
dated, 10 November 2001 and reads as follows: 
Departed position from which I spoke to you last night… We left on horse 
and linked up with the remainder of the element.  I had a meeting with the 
commander… We then departed from our initial linkup location and rode 
into Mazar-e-Sharif on begged, borrowed and confiscated transportation.  
While it looked like a rag-tag procession, the morale into Mazar-e Sharif 
was a triumphal procession.  All locals loudly greeted us and thanked all 
Americans.  Much waving, cheering and clapping, even form the 
women…  USN/USAF did a great job.  I am very proud of these men who 
have performed exceptionally well under very extreme conditions.  I have 
personally witnessed heroism under fire by two U.S. NCOs – one Army, 
one Air Force – when we came under fire last night, which was less than 
50 meters from me.  When I ordered them to call close air support, they 
did so immediately without flinching even though they were under fire.  
As you know, a U.S. element was nearly overrun four days ago and 
continued to call close air support and ensured Mujahadeen forces did not 
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suffer a defeat.  These two examples are typical of the performance of 
your soldiers and airmen.  Truly uncommon valor has been a common 
virtue amongst these men. 
This SITREP says a great deal as well.  First, it shows how resourceful and professional 
our SOF forces are.  Secondly, it implies we are somewhat unprepared for this type of 
contingency:  there were not sufficient SOF personnel in place for force protection and, 
they are not equipped sufficiently so that they are mobile.  In addition, communications, 
data links and targeting systems lack the reliability and range required (Defense News, 
2002, p 8). 
 
F. CONCLUSION  
Operations in Afghanistan are unique and may or may not be good indicators of 
things to come.  Other implications that surfaced, which will be addressed in the next 
chapter, include questions such as: Did the U.S. force structure and information system in 
Afghanistan resemble a networked organization?  Did this structure lower the intensity of 
fighting, allowing for “hit and run” air strikes and Northern Alliance clashes with the 
Taliban, both of which may resemble swarming tactics?  How does this paradigm of 
operations compare to the one employed by the Ninth Air Force in WWII?  Other issues 
that are prominent in this discussion relate to the problem of networked-hiders vs. 
networked-finders; small groups that are empowered by information technologies; the 
human mind as the locus of new and old technologies, new and old concepts of 
operations and the dialectic that results when symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare 
doctrine clash.  Finally, what is the significance of the human element in an information 































VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous chapters examined CAS and FAC use in WWII, current operations 
in CAS and FAC as well as operations in Afghanistan.  This chapter will examine some 
of the thoughts of our leadership in light of current operations.  The goal of this chapter is 
to determine the significance that human beings play in information systems based on the 
WWII case study and the examination of current operations.  This chapter will conclude 
by offering some recommendations and some suggestions for future research on this 
topic.  The next section contains a brief discussion of recent comments from a few senior 
Navy and DoD leaders. 
 
A. COMMENTS FROM THE LEADERSHIP 
 
“If you’re not growing, you’re dead” (Clark, 4 February 2002) 
The following three subsections contain the insights from three senior Navy and 
DoD leaders.  Their comments focus primarily on transformation and the operations in 
Afghanistan.  I have included them because their comments highlight human interaction 
with technology and the process of developing new concepts of operations.  The 
discussion on transformation is important because each leader extols the role of the 
individual sailor, marine, airman and soldier in the process.  Each would agree that the 
role of people in future systems is vital. 
1. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific 
During a presentation entitled “Force Transformation in the Pacific” last January, 
Adm. Blair made some pretty strong comments and indictments about the way our 
military is going about the current transformation.  He acknowledged that we are winning 
wars with the current systems but that we can do much better.  He stated that “we are 
wasting money, missing opportunities, and, worst of all, not using our greatest resource 
in the job of transformation – the sailors in the fleet and the soldiers in the field” (Blair, 
2002). 
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I think Adm. Blair is absolutely correct in this estimation of the current 
transformation.  It appears that most of the transformation activity and discussion resides 
in Washington D.C. and that it is motivated from the top-down.  Granted, low and mid-
grade military personnel want to see major changes in the services, but the environment 
for a bottom-up approach to transformation does not yet exist.  Currently, transformation 
is resident only in the briefing slides and boardroom discussions of the flag-ranked 
officers.  If real transformation is to occur, the culture and process of transformation must 
be inculcated in the lower ranks of the services, possibly tied to a reward system. 
Adm. Blair touched on this lack of participation from the lower echelons when he 
recounted a recent visit he had to an AEGIS destroyer.  The Admiral conceded that the 
improvements made to the AEGIS radar and combat systems were phenomenal.  
However, his most interesting comments were about an underway replenishment he 
observed.  He noticed that the U.S. Navy still uses a phone and distance line.  This line 
serves as a sound-powered phone communication link between the ships as well as a 
primitive way of marking the distance between the two ships.  It requires six sailors (who 
end up physically exhausted and wet) on each end of the line in order to provide an 
inaccurate representation of distance between the two ships. 
Adm. Blair commented that, using this system when there are highly accurate 
laser range finders available is “a symptom of deep systemic shortcomings.”  I would 
assume that many ships in the Pacific Fleet might now be using laser range finders (in 
addition to the phone and distance line of course) after Adm. Blair’s comments.  A 
military that encouraged transformational thinking at all levels, somewhat like the 
Germans in the interwar period, would likely have solved the phone and distance line 
problem long ago. 
Another issue that Adm. Blair talked about was the services’ fixation on 
technology and hardware.  There are two dynamics involved with this way of thinking.  
The first is the dynamic of replacing an aging system with a technically more advanced 
system.  The second dynamic occurs when a new technology is forced into the current 
way of doing business.  Adm. Blair says, “the emphasis is on the hardware – building a 
new class of platform rather than a new war-fighting capability” (Blair, 2002).  These 
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comments suggest that our military frames capability and readiness from a techno-centric 
paradigm. 
Commenting on current and past operations, Adm. Blair cited that there is a lack 
of development in concepts, command and control and communications.  The evolution 
of CAS in Afghanistan is evidence of this developmental deficiency.  He also charged, 
using events prior to Afghanistan as an example, that some senior leadership claimed that 
there was no operational requirement for forces to coordinate fires at the tactical level.  
Recent operations of SOFs, B-52s and Northern Alliance forces have dispelled that 
belief.  He also mentioned that with the new high-tech weapons systems (UAVs, PGMs, 
etc.) there has not been enough development or thought about how they should be used 
by our people. 
On the issue of using ground forces (i.e. people) or high-tech weapons and 
information systems, Adm. Blair used this analogy, “Given the choice, would any 
professional football team rely solely on its receivers and not develop its running game?  
I want both great receivers and great running backs.  I want to have the choice of the pass 
and the run, depending on the opponent, the field, and the rules” (Blair, 2002).               
 
2. Admiral Vernon Clark, Chief of Naval Operations 
On 4 February 2002 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, had 
the opportunity to talk to the students and faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School about 
his views on the future, Afghanistan and the transformation.  He expressed agreement 
with the concept of a capabilities based military vs. the old threat-based military of the 
past.  Adm. Clark reminded the audience that it is the responsibility of those people who 
wear the uniform and the civilians who work for the government to constantly ask the 
question, “Whether the capability that is being produced is able to meet the requirements 
of the President and the Secretary of Defense when we go forward to accomplish 
missions” (Clark, 4 February 2002)? 
Though he did not expressly state it, Adm. Clark suggested that all military 
members ought to think about the transformation.  In an attempt to show how 
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unpredictable this transformation may be (alluding to asymmetrical warfare), Adm. Clark 
said: 
I don’t know how we could have thought through the potential for 
operations in a place like Afghanistan and thought about the potential for 
transformation and thought about a bomber, an Air Force bomber or a 
Navy F-14 or a Navy F/A-18, operating in 24-hour orbits over 
Afghanistan with a special forces guy on the ground or a special forces 
guy on a horse and thought that that was going to be called transformation.  
What it suggests to me is that those people who think transformation is all 
about high-tech or the introduction of new technology, miss part of the 
definition of what transformation is all about (Clark, 4 February 2002). 
This observation about how the transformation process is proceeding in 
Afghanistan is important.  Adm. Clark stressed that the scenarios that our forces will 
operate under may be unpredictable.  I think that it is the unpredictability that makes 
having a transformation-minded force important.  It is also this unpredictability that will 
require not only our people to be flexible, but also our systems.  Adm. Clark said, “Look, 
it’s like this.  The last one wasn’t like this one; the next one won’t be like this one.  This 
one is like this one and that’s what’s going on” (Clark, 4 February 2002). 
Continuing with this concept of constantly changing circumstances and 
requirements, Adm. Clark hinted at the need for systems and people that were highly 
capable and flexible.  He said, “We live in a world today that we can’t always prepackage 
and pre-design everything that we might face in the future and what that means is that we 
have to be able to put together force packages more rapidly than ever before” (Clark, 4 
February 2002).  This means that we can no longer build weapons and information 
systems that are so highly specialized that they are not multi-mission capable.   
I think that one of the measures of what makes a system multi-mission capable 
ought to be the level of human input and interaction it allows.  For, as mentioned 
previously in this thesis, until information systems and weapons systems achieve the 
ability to judge (the act of command), they will always be constrained by their design 
parameters.  The future of transformation should focus on the ability of military people to 
extract the most utility out of the best technology.  In Adm. Clark’s words, “Our ability to 
meet challenges in the future are about our ability to grow minds, our ability to see 
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potential solutions in the future that we can’t get by brute forcing the financial 
[technology] end of this” (Clark, 4 February 2002). 
      
3. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, gave another interesting 
presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on 22 February 2002.  His presentation 
focused on transformation, the increased uncertainty in the world and operations in 
Afghanistan.  He said, “In this world that we live in today, it almost seems that surprise 
and uncertainty are an even more central element to what we do.”  He went on to say that, 
“we can’t afford to rely too much on single-point predictions of the future.  We’ve got to 
be prepared for the unexpected” (Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002).  Referring to comments 
made by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Dr. Wolfowitz stated that this transformation is 
about new approaches to problems, new cultures and mindsets, and new ways of thinking 
about things.  He also said, “We need smart people who can think about old things in new 
ways that make sense” (Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002). 
Dr. Wolfowitz’s view of the transformation is that its goal should be that only 10 
to 15 percent of the force is transformed.  By doing this, he argues, the capability of the 
entire force can be transformed.  He compares this 10 to 15 percent change to that of the 
German army and its Panzer units in WWII and their Blitzkrieg doctrine.  Dr. Wolfowitz 
maintains that Panzer warfare was the spearhead of the RMA that nearly beat the Allies 
in WWII.  He also talked about the effectiveness of the combination of German dive-
bombers with ground troops linked by radio.  Quoting General Ehrhart Milch of the 
German Air Force, Dr. Wolfowitz said, “The real secret is speed – the speed of attack 
through the speed of communication” (Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002).  This reference to 
the past is valid, but the AAF’s use of fighter-bombers, FACs, radar and radios in the 
ACC concept really brings truth to this quote.  Radio and radar were the information 
system that allowed the air and ground warfighters to take advantage of each other’s 
capabilities.   
   Dr. Wolfowitz spoke at length about the need for a transformation in thinking, 
leadership, training, exercises and fighting.  He stressed again and again that we must (in 
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addition to improving technology) continue to use old things in new ways.  Again, he 
cited the use of SOF units, B-52s and cavalry in Afghanistan.  Dr. Wolfowitz believes 
that we should use old, technologies with new concepts of operations, while continuously 
looking for new technologies.  Keeping these things in mind, he pointed out six 
transformational priorities that were outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
 The first priority is the protection of our bases of operation.  Dr. Wolfowitz said 
that we too often underestimate our opponents.  Since our enemies may not be able to 
meet us as equals on the conventional battlefield, they will try to use asymmetrical 
methods to attack us.  Attacking our bases of operations and homeland infrastructure is 
one way that this can occur.  In the future, it would be hubris if the U.S. were not 
prepared to defend itself against enemies who had long-range PGM capabilities. 
Technology cannot isolate U.S. warfighters from the battlefield. Instead, the 
battlefield will come to them.  No force would want or allow its adversary’s combatants 
to have free sanctuary throughout a conflict.  Whether deep underground in Colorado or 
over the skies in the Middle East, Asia or Africa, a determined opponent will seek and 
find those who would kill them and try to kill them first.  It is unpredictable how this may 
happen, but it will happen.  This fact leads to the second priority of transformation.   
The second transformational priority is to go after terrorists where they live – 
denying them sanctuary.  This priority is the embodiment of the hiders vs. finders 
scenario.  The issue of hiders vs. finders is becoming more important as our adversaries 
“packetize” themselves in an effort to evade detection from U.S. sensors.    Dr. 
Wolfowitz expressed the need to exploit our long-range precision strike capabilities to 
tackle this problem.  Commenting on the inter-service argument between air and ground 
commanders, Wolfowitz said that this priority will work best with air and ground forces 
working together (Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002).  This is evident in the ongoing 
Afghanistan operations.  Using the Gulf war to illustrate this point, Dr. Wolfowitz said: 
…when we were chasing Iraqi Scuds in the western desert of Iraq ten 
years ago, we had the capability to bomb them from the air but we 
couldn’t find them.  We sent brave Special Forces personnel on the ground 
to find them, but they didn’t have the capability to call in timely air 
strikes.  The result was that all we were able to take out during the course 
of that six weeks of chasing Scuds through the Iraqi desert was one 
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dummy.”  He went on to say, “if you can begin to think about putting 
ground forces places we never would have thought it possible before, in 
doing so you will not merely find targets, you will force targets to come 
out into the open  (Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002). 
The third priority is to counter hostile states’ attempts to keep us out of their 
geographic areas.  One solution to this is increased use of long-range strike capability 
(i.e. the aircraft carrier, long-range bombers and SOF configured submarines).  Reducing 
the need for forward basing could allow the U.S. to pursue technologies and a concept of 
operations strategy that would allow swarming.  This concept of operations necessitates 
that forces concentrate on a given target at a given time and disperse after the attack 
(Arquilla, 2001).  Reliance on forward basing may make swarming tactics difficult and 
predictable. 
Leveraging information technology is the fourth transformation priority that Dr. 
Wolfowitz talked about.  The men on horseback calling in CAS from B-52s in 
Afghanistan were leveraging information technology.  That is a prime example of small 
groups being empowered by information technology (Arquilla, 2001).  Dr. Wolfowitz 
points out that one of the problems facing the U.S. military in this priority is the 
limitation of bandwidth.  This point cannot be stressed enough, “We’re going to have to 
significantly improve the communications backbone of our military forces if we want to 
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the information revolution”  
(Wolfowitz, 22 February 2002). 
The fifth category of transformation priority is the conduct of effective 
information operations.  This priority includes the defense and efficient operation of our 
information systems as well as the attack or disruption of our enemy’s information 
systems.  So far, this has not been a challenge for the U.S. in the war on terrorism. 
Finally, the sixth priority of transformation is to maintain the unhindered access to 
space.  As space is the ultimate high ground, it will become more important to future 
operations.  More and more of our information systems will rely upon space-based 
systems and communications satellites.  This priority, while not an urgent matter now, it 
is essential to our future national security. 
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Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz reiterated that the key to the current 
transformation is people and ideas.  He said again that it is the people and ideas that this 
country can generate that is the heart of America’s power.      
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined information theory and looked at what makes up an 
information system.  A couple of things become apparent from this examination.  One 
thing is that information holds different meanings depending on the context in which it is 
used.  Another is that data is not information.  Data that is structured, in line and in order 
can be information; it depends on the user and his interpretations and requirements.  
Adm. Bill Owens’ process of data fusion into meaningful information is a human 
process.  Technology can only speed up that process, not replace it. 
An interesting result of the WWII case study was the nature of the Ninth Air 
Force command and control organizational structure.  This structure was very flat in 
nature when compared with typical military hierarchical structures of that time period.  In 
addition, the Ninth Air Force used liaison officers extensively at every level of the AGF 
command structure.  In essence, the relatively flat organizational arrangement (allowing 
for significant lateral communications, cooperation and asset rearrangement between 
units and squadrons), use of liaison officers and FACs, and the unpredictability of the 
Ninth Air Forces missions made it a highly networked organization.  By actively 
promoting the use of FACs and liaison officers, both as nodes in its network, the Ninth 
Air Force took advantage of its best resource, human beings.  These human beings 
combined superbly with the developing technologies of radar and radio to be decisive 
against the German army. 
The evolution of the Ninth Air Force’s organizational structure occurred over a 
relatively short period of time (e.g. the U.S. entry into WWII to the breakout of 
Normandy) and after a great deal of trial and error.  The success of this method of 
organization and resulting operational implementation can be credited to the theater 
commanders and individual airmen who developed it and made it work.  It is a good 
example of transformation from the bottom up.  This case is, perhaps, good grounds for 
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the argument that true transformation and innovation can only occur from the bottom up; 
it may be the only way to circumvent an organization’s innate resistance to change.    
    The ongoing operations in Afghanistan share some of the same elements as 
those of the Ninth Air Force in the ETO during WWII.  Like the FACs and ACC concept, 
the SOF units in Afghanistan are able to call for quick and decisive CAS when it is 
needed.  The main difference between the two cases is the technology surrounding the 
targeting and ordnance delivery capability.  GPS and PGMs (deployed from a distance) 
and satellite communications have replaced the need for the fighter-bomber pilot to have 
eyes on target for ordnance delivery.  Like the FACs in WWII the SOF FACs act as 
nodes in a broad network of National Alliance forces, aircraft carriers, B-52s, F/A-18s, F-
14s, F-15s, F-16s and command centers that span the globe.  Even the use of strategic air 
assets in a tactical environment is not new; although the use of B-52s for CAS has been 
decidedly better than in WWII (one area where technology improvements have paid 
dividends in human life). 
Afghanistan operations also show us that small groups (i.e. SOF units and the 
Northern Alliance) can be greatly empowered by information technology.  These 
relatively small groups, using old techniques of land warfare (horse cavalry) combined 
with new communications technology and PGMs, can defeat a numerically superior 
force.  With the understanding that operations are still ongoing and final judgment must 
be reserved, it is safe to say that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these 
events.  Hopefully, the lesson of placing capable human beings (warfighters) in a 
dynamic (asymmetrical) environment with the right tools (technology) can produce 
astonishing results (victory). 
Technology can do a great deal to improve the information systems that 
warfighters use to carry out their missions.  In relatively simple, symmetrical operations, 
technology may dominate the way warfighters engage the enemy.  This was the reality of 
Cold War doctrine and weapons development.  However, as the complexity of the 
missions increase, as in asymmetrical warfare, the human mind must be the principle 
element.  Information systems and technology will have to support this capability.  As 
quoted by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their 1997 book, In Athena’s Camp: 
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Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, the pulp cinema icon John Rambo said, 
“the mind is the greatest weapon” (160).  The goal of information systems and new 
technologies should be knowledge enhancement for the warfighter.  The two-by-two 
matrix in figure 10 illustrates this point: 
 
 
Figure 10.   Computer-Centric vs. Human-in-the-Loop Information Systems. 
 
In the preceding two-by-two matrix, I chose to relate symmetrical operations to 
the game of Chess and asymmetrical operations to the game of Go.  The nature of chess 
is very similar to conventional battles (i.e. before WWII and frequently since, including 
the Gulf War) where the opposing forces faced each other and battled until a victor 
remained (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p 161).  In these scenarios, a computer can do an 
outstanding job calculating moves to counter its opponent.  Therefore, a computer is 
often much better at this “game of calculation” than the human being (Arquilla, 2002).  
That is the reason for the three plusses in quadrant one.   
Clausewitz’s “fog of war” and human cognitive limitations are responsible for 
clouding man’s judgment resulting in mistakes and miscalculations.  Occasionally, a 
military genius may come along and manage to “see” more than his opponent.  The 
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presence of fog in war and the occasional military genius makes determining the outcome 
for quadrant two troublesome; therefore, a plus and minus in quadrant two is logical.  
Again, quadrant one and two represent symmetrical operations. 
The game of Go is very different from Chess.  In Go, the game starts with no 
pieces on the board.  The game proceeds on a very asymmetrical course, it is not linear 
like Chess.  Go requires one opponent to encircle the other and its focus is on the edges 
and corners of the board where it is easier to isolate and thus control territory.  “Thus Go, 
in contrast to Chess, is more about distributing one’s pieces than about massing them.  It 
is more about proactive insertion and presence than about maneuver” (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 1997, p 163). 
Go is more akin to a network approach to warfare.  Because it is not linear, 
computers have a difficult time doing the calculations necessary in Go.  This is the same 
for asymmetrical operations.  They can also be conducted in a distributed, network-like 
fashion.  For these reasons, quadrant three, asymmetric operations with computers, gets 
three minus signs.  On the contrary, the human mind is very adept at asymmetrical 
thinking.  It is linked to creativity and human cognition.  Human beings can often operate 
far better in an unpredictable environment where computers are at a disadvantage 
(Arquilla, 2002).  This is why quadrant four rates three plusses. 
Hopefully, the two-by-two matrix in figure 10 illustrates what this thesis has set 
out to accomplish (i.e. to determine the significance of the human element in an 
information system).  Human beings are indeed essential elements in information 
systems.  An information system without human interaction cannot logically be called an 
information system since it does not inform anyone.  Information technology has done a 
great deal to improve information systems and improve warfighting capabilities.  What is 
important is that commanders and information systems designers do not fixate on the 
technology but the people who use it. 
The WWII case study and examination of current operations show that 
technology (the information system) played a secondary, yet essential, role in operations.  
The human influence, through tactics, doctrine development, organizational change and 
trial and error, was the decisive and key element in each case.  Other issues that presented 
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themselves in this study include: communications difficulties continue to hinder efficient 
operations; inter-service rivalry and non-compatibility (technological as well as cultural) 
are still factors that limit military effectiveness; innovation may be more effective if it is 
fostered from the bottom-up vs. the top-down; innovative thinking ought to be sponsored 
at all levels in the military; organizational change is slow but may evolve out of 
necessity, as it should; and finally, technology should follow required functions (tactics 
and strategy should not be dictated by technology).        
       
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This study focused primarily on the WWII case study of CAS and FAC.  It took 
the analysis of that case study and applied/compared it to current operations.  In this 
instance, the significance of the human element in information systems was shown to be 
quite great.  In fact, the presence of the human being was decisive in operational 
effectiveness.  It is recommended that this study be expanded to include other conflicts 
where CAS and FACs were used or not used.  It would be very beneficial to determine if 
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